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Abstract
The ﬁrst two chapters of this dissertation concern the effect of public catastrophic insurance pro-
grams. In the ﬁrst chapter, I show how these programs, which only protect against large health
shocks, induce advantageous selection in private insurance. I use data on older Americans with
Medicare insurance from the Health and Retirement Study to test if individuals with supplemental
private health insurance are systematically lower-risk in states with public catastrophic insurance
programs. I ﬁnd that these programs decrease the average health risk for the privately insured
by $700 and that a one standard deviation increase in an individual’s health risk decreases her
probability of having private insurance by 4 percentage points.
In the second chapter, I show that these programs reduce the incentive to invest in risk-reducing
activities. I ﬁnd large decreases in self-protection after a program is introduced and that individuals
for whom the program is less generous are more likely to engage in self-protection. These effects
are stronger for women than for men and apply to a variety of investments in health, including
decisions about smoking, obesity, and cancer screening.
The third chapter considers a different form of government intervention in insurance markets.
In this chapter, I study laws mandating that employer-sponsored health insurance provide coverage
for mental illness. I show that industries for which mental health coverage became more generous
had larger increases in the average mental distress of their insured workforce. Part of the increase
in generosity was due to regulations mandating coverage of mental health beneﬁts. I then show that
these regulations affected the behavior of individuals in the labor market—individuals who value
more generous mental health beneﬁts and switch jobs work longer hours after these regulations
take effect, but individuals who do not value mental health beneﬁts decrease their labor supply.
These results are consistent with ﬁrms cutting back on their demand for labor due to the cost of
the mandate, which leads to lower wages and a decrease in labor supply by individuals who do not
value mental health beneﬁts, but an increase in labor supply by individuals who do value mental
health beneﬁts highly.
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viiiChapter 1
Selection and Public Insurance: Evidence
from Medicare and the Medicaid Medically
Needy Program
1.1 Introduction
An essential prediction of many models of insurance is that higher risk individuals purchase
more generous insurance than do lower risk individuals, i.e. the market for insurance should be
adversely selected (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976; Wilson, 1977). However, a growing body of
research ﬁnds evidence for the opposite relationship—higher risk individuals tend to have less
generous insurance than lower risk individuals.1 In some cases, this negative correlation arises
because more risk averse individuals are lower risk, but those individuals also have a preference
1Cawley and Philipson (1999) study the market for life insurance and reject the hypothesis that higher risk (higher
mortality) individuals purchase more insurance than do lower risk individuals. Finkelstein and Poterba (2004), study-
ing the market for annuities, ﬁnd no evidence that higher risk (lower morality) individuals purchase annuities with
higher annual payments, but do ﬁnd evidence of adverse selection on other dimensions of the annuity contract. Cardon
and Hendel (2001) ﬁnd no relationship between risk and generosity of health insurance coverage among individuals
with employer-provided health insurance. Fang et al. (2008) conclude that lower risk (healthier) individuals are more
likely to purchase Medicare Supplementary insurance. Cohen and Siegelman (2010) provide a thorough review of the
literature on adverse selection.
1Chapter 1: Selection and Public Insurance 2
for more insurance (Cutler et al., 2008).2 But in some markets, for example the health insurance
marketthatIstudy, safetynetcoveragethatprovidesmoreprotectionforlargerisksthanforsmaller
risks may cause advantageous selection in the demand for private insurance.
Speciﬁcally, I demonstrate that public insurance causes advantageous selection in the markets
for Medigap and Medicare Advantage health insurance plans, private plans which complement or
substitute for health insurance provided by the U.S. Medicare program. In this case public insur-
ance provides catastrophic, or high-deductible, coverage that reduces out-of-pocket spending for
high-risk individuals compared to their out-of-pocket spending with either type of private insur-
ance. But, this program has minimal effects on out-of-pocket spending for lower risk individuals.
As a result, lower risk individuals are more likely to purchase private insurance than are higher
risk individuals. In addition to selection effects from the presence of public catastrophic insurance
(PCI), more generous programs—those with lower deductibles—should have a larger effect on se-
lection since smaller health shocks admit an individual into the program. Finally, the catastrophic
insurance programs I study use an individual’s holdings of certain types of assets to determine the
deductible, so individuals should have lower holdings of assets that are included in the deductible
calculation.
I test for selection from PCI in the U.S. Medicare program, which provides health insurance to
almost all Americans over the age of 65 and has several unique features that make suitable for test-
ing if PCI can induce advantageous selection. First, Medicare uses high cost-sharing requirements
to deter excess utilization, leading to the creation of two regulated forms of supplemental private
insurance, Medigap, which pays the cost-sharing requirements in Medicare, and Medicare Advan-
tage, which is a private alternative to the traditional Medicare program that substitutes supply-side
techniques to control costs for the cost-sharing approach used in traditional Medicare. Enrollment
in either of these forms of supplemental insurance is voluntary. Second, some states provide PCI
through state Medicaid Medically Needy programs, while other states provide no catastrophic risk
protection, which enables me to test for selection from this program. Third, the introduction of
prescription drug coverage in 2006 (the Medicare Part D program) makes PCI more expensive to
the individual, in the sense that an individual has less medical spending—because of prescription
2Finkelstein and Poterba (2006) develop a more general test for adverse or advantageous selection based on the
idea that some characteristics are correlated with insurance coverage and risk, but are not observed by insurers (or
used in either pricing policies or accepting applicants).Chapter 1: Selection and Public Insurance 3
drug coverage—to use to hit the deductible, hence there should be less selection from PCI after
prescription drug coverage takes effect.3
I use data from the Health and Retirement Study, an ongoing survey of older Americans, which
provides detailed information on insurance coverage, health status, assets, and income. In order to
maximize statistical power, I restrict my sample to higher risk individuals who are more likely to be
affectedbytheincentivesprovidedbytheMedicallyNeedyprogram. Overall, Ireplicateaprevious
ﬁnding (Fang et al., 2008) that the privately insured are lower risk than those without private
insurance—inaregressionofhealthriskonanindicatorforprivateinsurance, Iﬁndthatindividuals
with private insurance are on average .06 standard deviations4 healthier than those without private
insurance. I explain the reason for this: privately insured individuals are lower risk in states with
MedicallyNeedyprograms, by0.10standarddeviations, comparedtotheprivatelyinsuredinstates
without such programs. When I look at Medigap and Medicare Advantage separately, I ﬁnd that
average risk is higher in Medigap plans when PCI becomes less generous (i.e. when the deductible
is higher). The introduction of Medicare Part D, which resulted in larger health shocks being
necessary for individuals to be eligible for Medically Needy coverage, increased the average risk
amongtheprivatelyinsuredinstateswithMedicallyNeedyprograms. Lastly, Iﬁndthatindividuals
living in states with Medically Needy programs are 2.6 percentage points (30%) more likely to use
Medicaid, which houses the Medically Needy program, for at least one month over the subsequent
two years and these users have higher current risk scores, by 0.3 standard deviations, in states with
Medically Needy programs, relative to users in states without such programs. These results imply
that the marginal users due to state Medically Needy programs are considerably sicker than the
average individual.
I also ﬁnd that individuals are shifting the composition of their assets, but not reducing their
asset holdings, in response to Medically Needy programs: the Medically Needy program reduces
the share of total wealth results held in assets that are used in computing the deductible by 19
percentage points and increases home equity by 17.6 percentage points. However, in states with
less generous programs, individuals shift fewer assets into home equity, most likely because they
3The Medicare Part D program also includes substantial subsidies making Part D optimal for more than 80% of
seniors in the ﬁrst year and more than %97 percent of seniors because of late-enrollment penalties (Heiss et al., 2010).
4Each standard deviation corresponds to approximately $7,000 in total expected health care spending.Chapter 1: Selection and Public Insurance 4
do not expect to use the Medically Needy program. But the net effect is small, for the average state
Medically Needy program, this shift in the composition of assets reduces the deductible by $5,000
and increases home equity by almost $7,500.
The selection results are strongest for individuals with higher cognitive ability. In particular, I
ﬁnd that health risk among the insured is lower for high ability individuals in states with Medically
Needy programs, but cognitive ability has no effect in states without these programs. Given the
complex incentives created by the Medically Needy program, these ﬁndings lend credence to my
interpretations. Furthermore, these results provide an explanation for how cognitive ability, which
has been shown to be an important source of advantageous selection (Fang et al., 2008), affects
selection into insurance.
1.2 Related Literature
The empiricalliterature on selection issubstantial, covering a variety of markets and employing
various methods. One basic approach tests for a correlation between risk and insurance coverage,
which indicates the presence of an information asymmetry. The sign of the correlation enables
researchers to distinguish between different types of information asymmetries—a positive correla-
tion indicates the presence of either moral hazard or adverse selection, while a negative correlation
indicates advantageous selection.5
Researchers have applied this positive correlation test to a variety of markets with varied im-
plications for the direction of selection. Cawley and Philipson (1999) study the market for term
life insurance and ﬁnd, positive selection, that higher risk (higher mortality) individuals were less
likely to purchase insurance and purchased policies with smaller face amounts. In the market for
voluntary annuities in the United Kingdom, Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) conclude that annuities
are advantageously selected on payment levels—individuals who purchase more generous annu-
ities are also more likely to die—but indexed annuities or escalating annuities were more likely to
be purchased by longer-lived individuals, indicating adverse selection.
5Moralhazard, likeadverse selection, wouldmake therelationshipbetween riskandinsurance morepositive, hence
the only way to get a negative correlation is if advantageous selection outweighs moral hazard.Chapter 1: Selection and Public Insurance 5
A number of papers, relevant to this work, have studied selection in health insurance markets.6
Cutler and Reber (1998) use a change in how Harvard University contributed to its employees’
health insurance plans to document the existence of adverse selection and the exit from the market
of the most generous plan. However, Cardon and Hendel (2001) estimated a structural model of
insurance choice jointly with health care consumption using data from the 1987 National Medicare
Care Expenditure Survey ﬁnd no evidence of asymmetric information among individuals with
employer-provided insurance coverage. Finkelstein and McGarry’s (2006) study of long-term care
insurance presents a more nuanced picture of selection with some individuals purchasing insurance
because they are high risk, indicating adverse selection, while others purchase insurance out of
caution.
The closest paper to the current one is by Fang et al. (2008), who demonstrate that there is ad-
vantageous selection in the market for Medigap insurance. Using data from the Medicare Current
Beneﬁciary Survey (MCBS) and the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), they document lower
spending for individuals with Medigap coverage when they only control for the variables insurers
use when pricing policies.7 They are able to reject one common source for advantageous selection,
heterogeneity in risk aversion (de Meza and Webb, 2001), and conclude that advantageous selec-
tionisduetocognitiveability. Theycometothisconclusionbynotingthatconditionaloncognitive
ability there is a statistically signiﬁcant and positive correlation between coverage and risk, how-
ever, they are unable to identify the mechanism by which cognitive ability induces advantageous
selection.
There have been a number of other studies of Medigap which have found evidence of adverse
selection. For example, Wolfe and Goddeeris (1991) using the 1970s Retirement History Study
document a positive correlation between lagged spending residuals and Medigap purchase among
Medicare beneﬁciaries, which they interpret as indicating that the Medigap market is adversely
selected.8 Ettner (1997) approaches the question of selection into Medigap coverage by using
6See Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) for a more through review of the literature on selection in health insurance.
7The negative coefﬁcient demonstrates advantageous selection since there are two potential information
asymmetries—moral hazard and selection. Moral hazard would tend to increase spending (Manning et al., 1987),
as would adverse selection, hence the negative coefﬁcient demonstrates advantageous selection.
8Finkelstein (2004) draws similar conclusions for the same time period based on the behavior of consumers and
insurers in response to minimum beneﬁt standards that were introduced in the late 1970s.Chapter 1: Selection and Public Insurance 6
individuals with employer-sponsored supplemental insurance, which she assumes is exogenous,
to identify moral hazard; the remaining difference in utilization between those with and without
Medigap coverage is the deﬁned to be the selection effect. Based on data from the 1991 MCBS,
she ﬁnds evidence that Medigap plans are adversely selected and that Medigap coverage leads to
moral hazard. These earlier ﬁndings are not inconsistent with Fang, et al. because a substantial
reform of the Medigap market in 1992 may have affected the direction of selection.9
1.3 Institutional Background
Medicare is the principal source of insurance for individuals over the age of 65 in the United
States, but it only covers certain goods and services. The program is divided into four parts:
Part A provides insurance for hospital expenses and home health; Part B pays for physician and
outpatient expenses; Part C, also known as Medicare Advantage, provides a private alternative to
Parts A and B using managed care as a substitute for cost-sharing to constrain utilization; and
Part D provides prescription drug coverage through subsidized private plans. Most individuals
receive Part A coverage by virtue of having paid into the system while working and purchase Part
B coverage (>95% of Medicare Part A enrollees also have Part B coverage); Parts C and D charge
premiums based on a formula that depends on the cost of insuring the average individual, relative
to a benchmark.10 In addition to premiums, payroll taxes, and general revenue funds, Medicare
Parts A and B use cost-sharing11 both to lower costs and limit utilization.
In light of Medicare’s substantial cost-sharing requirements, most Medicare beneﬁciaries have
some form of supplemental insurance that pays some, or all, of the cost-sharing and may cover
additional services. In about 30 percent of cases, supplemental coverage is provided by previous
employers. However, for individuals who do not have coverage from a previous employer, Medi-
care Advantage provides comparable coverage to traditional Medicare with lower cost-sharing
9The reform limited Medigap insurers to offer a ﬁxed set of plan designs, limited medical loss ratios, and prescribed
when insurers could reject applicants on the basis of health.
10Parts C and D use different methods to construct benchmarks. The Part C benchmark is essentially set by Congress
(McGuire et al., 2011), while the Part D benchmark is based on costs of an insurer’s competitors, providing a form of
yardstick competition (Shleifer, 1985).
11In 2005, consumers paid $912 per discharge for hospital care (with additional payments for stays longer than 60
days), a $110 annual Part B deductible, and 20% coinsurance for Part B services, in nominal terms.Chapter 1: Selection and Public Insurance 7
requirements, while Medigap plans pays the cost-sharing requirements of traditional Medicare.
These plans, however, still provide only a limited reduction in risk, for example, Medigap plans
will pay Medicare coinsurance, but they do not provide meaningful prescription drug coverage.
State Medicaid programs provide the ﬁnal source of coverage with all states providing sup-
plemental coverage, similar to Medigap, to individuals who have income less than 100% of the
poverty line and more comprehensive coverage for individuals who are eligible for Supplemental
Security Income.12 But, individuals who have Social Security income in excess of the income lim-
its for Medicaid eligibility13 are only eligible for Medicaid coverage in states that have “Medically
Needy” programs. These programs base eligibility on a combination of having limited count-
able assets14 and income net of medical expenses below a speciﬁc limit. These limits deﬁne a
person-speciﬁc “deductible,” based on the greater of an individual’s assets in excess of the asset
limit or her income in excess of the income limit. Unlike the deductible in traditional insurance
plans, the Medically Needy deductible is essentially a life time deductible because the deductible
is almost always determined by an individual’s countable assets. After the individual has medical
expenses exceeding her deductible she is eligible for Medicare coverage through the Medically
Needy program. Figure 1.1 presents the Medically Needy asset limits for 2002 and 2008, which
demonstrates that there has been little variation over time in these limits, with the exception of
New York which more than tripled the asset limit in 2008. However, a number of states made other
notable changes—Oklahoma and Oregon terminated their programs in 2002, and Tennessee froze
enrollment in 2005 but reopened the program in 2008.
12Some states do not provide coverage for all individuals with SSI coverage because of more stringent Medicaid
eligibility standard, but these states must permit individuals with SSI to become eligible for Medicaid by paying a
person-speciﬁc deductible that is similar to the Medically Needy program described below.
13Social Security income is not unique in this regard, but rather because Social Security provides a ﬁxed payment,
adjustedforinﬂation, anindividualcannotreduceherSocialSecurityincomeinordertobecomeeligibleforMedicaid.
14Countable assets excludes the primary home, usually one car, and household goods.Chapter 1: Selection and Public Insurance 8
Figure 1.1: State Medically Needy Asset Limits, Single Individuals
Note: Tennessee had suspended enrollment in its Medically Needy program from 2005 through 2007.
1.4 Public Catastrophic Insurance and Selection
Public catastrophic insurance can cause advantageous selection by being more attractive to
high risk than to low risk individuals. In my setting the government offers public catastrophic
insurance that provides full insurance after out-of-pocket spending exceeds a certain level, while
private insurers only offer partial insurance. So the protection provided by PCI is analogous to a
high deductible insurance plan. I assume that an individual knows her health risk, which is related
to her spending in the event of a loss, risk varies in the population, and insurers do not use risk
to set premiums.15 Private insurance can reduce an individual’s out-of-pocket spending, but not
15In my setting this is because of government regulations, but insurers would also be unable to price on risk if risk
were not observable to the insurer.Chapter 1: Selection and Public Insurance 9
eliminate it, and out-of-pocket spending will be higher for higher risk individuals. As a result
higher risk individuals will be more likely to purchase insurance, while lower risk individuals will
not. Therefore, individuals purchasing private insurance will be systematically higher risk than
those who do not purchase private insurance, in the absence of PCI, which is the standard adverse
selection result from Akerlof (1970).
Introducing a PCI program limits an individual’s out-of-pocket spending to her deductible. As
a result, if the deductible is sufﬁciently low (less than the insurance premium and her expected
out-of-pocket spending with insurance is sufﬁcient), then she is better off not purchasing private
insurance because she will expect to spend more with private insurance than without it. Because
out-of-pocket spending is a function of risk, higher risk individuals will be more likely to exceed
the deductible and, therefore, should be less likely to purchase private insurance than lower risk
individuals. Therefore the privately insured are lower risk when there is a PCI program to siphon
off high-risk individuals, than when there is no such program, leading to advantageous selection
because of the PCI program. In addition, when the deductible is higher—the program becomes less
generous—some higher risk individuals who were on the margin of purchasing private insurance
will now ﬁnd that private insurance offers a better deal than the public program, which increases
the average risk among the privately insured.
TheintroductionofMedicarePartDaffectedthedecisiontopurchaseprivateinsuranceinstates
with Medically Needy programs. Prior to the widespread availability of public prescription drug
coverage, beginning in 2006, individuals with high prescription drug spending would have little
incentive to purchase private insurance since they could exceed the PCI deductible on prescription
drug spending alone. After Part D took effect, these individuals were better off purchasing pre-
scription drug insurance that lowered their total prescription drug spending.16 As a result, they are
less likely to exceed the deductible and more likely to purchase private insurance. The individuals
who are induced to take up private insurance coverage because of prescription drug coverage will
be higher risk individuals, so Medicare Part D increases average risk among the privately insured
in states with a Medically Needy program.
These predictions can be summarized as:
1. Introducing PCI lowers the average risk of individuals who purchase private insurance;
16The Federal government pays, on average, 74:%5 of costs.Chapter 1: Selection and Public Insurance 10
2. When PCI programs become more generous—i.e. the deductible is lower—the average risk
of the privately insured will be lower;
3. The probability that an individual has private insurance coverage is lower for higher risk
individuals when there is a PCI program;
4. The probability that an individual has private insurance coverage is higher for individuals
with higher deductibles; and
5. When a larger health shock is required to exceed the deductible then the average risk in the
private insurance pool will be higher.
The design of the Medicaid Medically Needy program implies a sixth prediction because the
deductible in Medically Needy programs is a function of an individual’s holdings of certain classes
of assets and her income. Thus, there is an incentive to shift one’s wealth into asset classes that are
not included in the deductible calculation (Hubbard et al., 1995; Kotlikoff, 1986; Levin, 1995).17
As a result, the share of wealth held in asset classes that are exempt from the deductible calculation
should be higher in states with Medically Needy programs.
Sources of supplemental coverage interact with the Medicare program in various ways. In
order to shed light on these interactions, Figure 1.2 presents the relationship between out-of-pocket
spending risk, health risk and the value of private Medigap insurance coverage (the construction
of these graphs is described in appendix 1.A). The top graph presents the certainty equivalent, a
measure of out-of-pocket spending risk,18 for individuals with Medigap, or no insurance in one
of three conditions—no Medically Needy program, a Medically Needy program with high asset
limits (so a lower deductible, $20,000), and a less generous Medically Needy program ($40,000
deductible)—as a function of health risk. These certainty equivalents are highly correlated and
follow the expected pattern of rising with health risk. The lower graph presents the willingness to
pay for Medigap compared to each of the three no insurance situations, where willingness to pay
is deﬁned as the certainty equivalent for the alternative less the certainty equivalent for Medigap.
17Kotlikoff (1986) and Hubbard et al. (1995) demonstrate that means-tested social and health insurance programs
reduce savings, although neither paper studies how these programs affect the composition of wealth. Levin (1995)
demonstrates that individuals with larger holdings of assets that are excluded from a means-test are more likely to rely
on means-tested insurance, although he assumes that assets are exogenously determined.
18The measure is how much an individual would pay to avoid all of her out-of-pocket spending risk.Chapter 1: Selection and Public Insurance 11
Figure 1.2: Health Risk, Certainty Equivalent and Willingness to Pay for Insurance
Notes: Health risk (capped at 2) on the x-axis. Certainty equivalent and willingness to pay for Medigap coverage,
calculated as described in the Appendix using a CARA utility function with coefﬁcient of absolute risk aversion of
0.00001, which corresponds to a coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion of 1 at median total wealth. The top graph
presents the certainty equivalent for four conditions—with private supplemental insurance (“Medigap”), without any
supplemental insurance, and two Medically Needy programs that differ in the deductible. The bottom graph plots the
willingness to pay for Medigap coverage, compared to the remaining three conditions. Data come from the Medical
Expenditure Panel Survey from 2000-2008 and excludes Medicare beneﬁciaries with Medicaid or any employer
provided insurance. See Appendix 1.A for additional details.
In the absence of a Medically Needy program, willingness to pay for Medigap is increasing with
health risk, which would lead to adverse selection in the Medigap market or the failure of markets
to form (Akerlof, 1970). However, the introduction of either type of Medically Needy program
reduces the willingness to pay for Medigap for the highest-risk individuals because, conditionalChapter 1: Selection and Public Insurance 12
on needing care, this population is more likely to exceed their deductible simply with spending on
goods and services that are not covered by Medigap insurance, so Medigap provides no additional
risk protection.
1.5 Data and Methods
1.5.1 Data
Data for this study come from the core and exit surveys of the Health and Retirement Study
(HRS), which is a longitudinal survey of more than 30,000 individuals near or in retirement. The
initial sample was recruited in 1992 and additional cohorts were recruited in 1998 and 2004 so that
the sample is representative of the U.S. population over the age of 50. The survey instrument was
redesigned in 2002 in ways that made it easier to identify different types of supplemental insur-
ance, hence I only use data from the 2002 through 2008 cores waves of the survey and the 2004
through 2008 exit surveys in order to ascertain insurance coverage prior to death. I restrict the
sample to individuals 65 and older with Medicare Parts A and B (or Medicare Part C) coverage,
who do not have supplemental insurance from a former employer or the military and who are not
currently enrolled in Medicaid. I deﬁne employer-sponsored insurance as any non-drug insurance
plan that is purchased from or provided by an individual’s former employer, a spouse’s current or
former employer, or the employer or union of a previous spouse. All other private insurance plans
are assumed to be individually purchased; in some analyses I distinguish between Medigap and
Medicare Advantage plans and I assign individuals who report both types of coverage to Medicare
Advantage (270 observations report both Medigap and Medicare Advantage coverage). An indi-
vidual is a future Medicaid user if in her next interview (two years later) or in an exit interview her
proxy reports that she ever used Medicaid for a non-nursing home purpose since her last interview.
With the exception of the Exit interview, I exclude all observations with a proxy respondent or who
failed to provide a complete interview (1,388 observations).
I measure risk using an individual’s self-report of ever having been diagnosed with one of a
speciﬁed list of conditions. I convert these diagnoses into an index of risk using the CMS Medi-
care Advantage risk adjustment weights for 2004 (CMS, 2003). These weights are calibrated to
approximate an individual’s spending in the subsequent year, based on physician diagnoses asChapter 1: Selection and Public Insurance 13
reported on Parts A and B claims. The self-reported diagnoses that I use introduce a potential
sources of bias because I could be capturing diagnoses from many years in the past and individuals
may incorrectly report that they do, or do not, have a given condition. For purposes of predicting
spending, this type of bias would be problematic, but an individual’s recalled diagnoses are more
likely to reﬂect the information she uses when assessing her own health and choosing to purchase
insurance. I convert the risk score into a mean 0, standard deviation 1 variable with one standard
deviation corresponding to $7,000 in total spending. The diagnoses that I include in the score
and the associated weights are in Appendix Table 1.A.
I use asset and income imputations for the HRS developed by RAND to measure total wealth,
countable assets, exempt assets, and earned and unearned income. I deﬁne exempt assets as equity
in the primary residence, vehicles,19 and other assets (primarily household goods). Countable
assets are all other assets, net of debt. All dollar ﬁgures are converted to real 2010 dollars using
the CPI-U.
I restrict my sample to individuals whose Social Security income exceeds the SSI threshold
(makingthem ineligiblefor mostnon-Medically NeedyMedicaid programs), have countableassets
that are less than $200,000 (making it at least plausible that they will exceed their deductible in
their lifetime), and have health risk scores that are no more than one-half of a standard deviation
below the mean health risk (eliminating individuals who would not be likely to purchase private
insurance because they are too healthy).
I measure cognitive ability using the ﬁrst principal component from a factor analysis of an
individual’s ability to recall a list of ten words immediately and after a ﬁve minute delay, the
number of times she correctly subtracts seven from 100, the number of correct answers given to
three mathematical word problems (numeracy), and an adapted version of the Telephone Interview
for Cognitive Status (Ofstedal et al., 2005). Because individuals only report on numeracy in 2002
and 2006, I ﬁll in numeracy in 2004 and 2008 based on the previous wave.
Data on state Medically Needy programs come from surveys by the Kaiser Family Foundation
(KaiserFamilyFoundation,2003,2009), stateregulatorycodes, anddiscussionswithofﬁcialsfrom
state Medicaid agencies to clarify any disagreements. I further restrict the sample to unmarried
19Most Medically Needy programs only permit individuals to exempt one vehicle, but the HRS asks about all
vehicles combined.Chapter 1: Selection and Public Insurance 14
individuals living alone and married individuals living in two-person households20 in order to
match the state rules. I use these rules to construct the deductible based on the income disregards
that are used to determine eligibility for Supplemental Security Income.21
Table 1.1 compares individuals living in states with and without Medically Needy programs.
On most dimensions the two groups are similar, but private supplemental insurance is more com-
mon, rather than less common, in states with a Medically Needy program. Other demographic
differences—in particular age and gender—provide some explanation for the difference in insur-
ance coverage. Differences in health status and wealth, which could be troublesome, are small and
do not rise to statistical signiﬁcance.
1.5.2 Empirical methods and identiﬁcation
I test for risk selection based on correlations between coverage and risk and allow selection
to differ in states with and without Medically Needy programs. The introduction of Medicare
Part D complicates the analysis since it may affect risk selection, so I include interactions with an
indicator for Medicare Part D. The resulting model can be written as:
Hist =b1MNst +b2Insuredist +b3Insuredist PartDt +b4MNst PartDt
+b5MNst Insuredist +b6MNst PartDt Insuredist
+b7Deductist +b8Deductist PartDt +b9Deductist Insuredist
+b10Deductist PartDt Insuredist +XitG+ss+tt +eist
(1.1)
Where Hist is health status for person i in state s for year t, MNst is a dummy for living in
a state with a Medically Needy program, Insuredist is a dummy for private insurance, PartDt is
an indicator for the period after Medicare Part D took effect (2006 and later), Deductist is the
“deductible” an individual must spend in order to be eligible for public insurance coverage and is
0 in states without a Medically Needy program, Xit is a vector of other individual characteristics,
20The HRS does not assign assets to individuals, but rather to households, and state Medicaid rules differ consider-
ably for individuals with a spouse in a nursing home.
21The disregards are $20 per month of unearned income and $65 per month plus one half of all earned income.
Almost all states use these disregards in every year.Chapter 1: Selection and Public Insurance 15
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Medically Needy (N=5570) Not Medically Needy (N=1705)
Mean SD Mean SD
Any private insurance 0.68 (0.47) 0.63 (0.48)
Medicare Advantage 0.36 (0.48) 0.35 (0.48)
Medicare and Medigap 0.32 (0.47) 0.27 (0.45)
Medicaid ever next wave 0.06 (0.24) 0.07 (0.25)
Health risk score 0.54 (0.92) 0.53 (0.94)
Smoker 0.09 (0.29) 0.11 (0.31)
Deductible 42646 (51665) 0 NA
Simulated Deductible 44422 (17767) 0 NA
Financial wealth 44086 (53070) 43375 (52199)
Age 78.0 (7.6) 77.0 (7.4)
Female 0.54 (0.50) 0.49 (0.50)
Race
White 0.83 (0.38) 0.81 (0.39)
Black 0.11 (0.32) 0.10 (0.30)
Hispanic 0.05 (0.22) 0.08 (0.27)
Other 0.01 (0.09) 0.01 (0.09)
Marital status
Married 0.44 (0.50) 0.49 (0.50)
Separated / Divorced 0.08 (0.27) 0.08 (0.28)
Widowed 0.46 (0.50) 0.42 (0.49)
Never married 0.02 (0.12) 0.01 (0.11)
Education
Less than high school 0.31 (0.46) 0.30 (0.46)
High school 0.55 (0.50) 0.56 (0.50)
Any college
Advanced degree 0.03 (0.18) 0.04 (0.20)
2006 and later 0.53 (0.50) 0.58 (0.49)
Cognitive Ability 0.01 (0.98) -0.03 (0.99)
ss and tt are state and year ﬁxed effects, and eist is the error term. Three of my predictions map
directly onto coefﬁcients in this regression. First, the Medically Needy program lowers risk in the
private insurance pool if b5 <0. Second, the private insurance pool is higher risk in states with less
generous Medically Needy programs, which implies higher deductibles, if b9 > 0. Third Medicare
Part D reduces advantageous selection from the Medically Needy program if b6 > 0.
The model in (1.1) is suited for addressing the predictions about the average risk among theChapter 1: Selection and Public Insurance 16
insured, but can not address the predictions about how ﬁnancial and health risk affect the demand
for insurance. To test those predictions, I estimate the model:
Insuredist =d1MNst +d2MNst PartDt +d3Deductist
+d4Deductist PartDt +d5MNst Hist
+d6MNst Hist PartDt +q1Hist PartDt
+ f (Hist)+XitG+ss+tt +eist
(1.2)
Where f (Hist) is a cubic polynomial in health status. High risk individuals are less likely
to have private insurance coverage if d5 < 0, while individuals with higher deductibles are more
likely to have private insurance coverage if d3 > 0. d1 provides a measure of crowd-out from the
Medically Needy program.22
To test if countable assets are lower in states with Medically Needy programs I run the regres-
sion:
Aist =g1MNst +g2MNst PartDt +g3SimDeductst
+g4SimDeductst PartDt +XitG+ri+tt +eist
(1.3)
Where Aist is a measure of asset holdings (either the level of holdings of a particular type of
asset, or the share of total wealth held in a given asset class) and ri is an individual ﬁxed effect. The
individual ﬁxed effect accounts for the fact that I can not accurately measure permanent income,
henceIcannotconstructasset-to-permanentincomeratios. TheMedicallyNeedyprogramreduces
countable asset holdings if g1 <0. Interpreting the coefﬁcients on the simulated deductible is more
difﬁcultbecausetherearetwobehavioralresponsesatworkreﬂectingtheﬁnancialcostofusingthe
Medically Needy program and the probability that an individual will use the program. Holding the
probability of use constant, one would expect individuals to reduce their countable asset holdings
in order to lower the ﬁnancial cost. However, the individual can manipulate the probability of use
by increasing her holdings of countable assets. Hence, the signs of g3 and g4 are ambiguous
22Neither of the regressions in (1.1) and (1.2) are written as difference-in-differences models. However, in fact
they are difference-in-differences models, but can not be written as such because the deductible in states without a
Medically Needy program is inﬁnite. In Appendix 1.B I elaborate on this point and demonstrate both the formal
equivalence between the speciﬁcations in (1.1) and (1.2) and the standard difference-in-differences model and that my
preferred speciﬁcation both solves a co-linearity problem and provides readily interpretable results.Chapter 1: Selection and Public Insurance 17
If individuals do alter their savings decisions in response to the Medically Needy program then
the deductible will be endogenous. Therefore, I instrument for the Medically Needy deductible us-
ing a “simulated deductible” (Currie and Gruber, 1996; Mahoney, 2012). I construct the simulated
deductible for K groups deﬁned by exogenous demographic characteristics: age group (65-69,70-
74,75-79,80 and up), gender, education, and race/ethnicity. Denoting the individual’s vector of
assets and income by Ai, the rules in effect in state s and yeart by Rst, her demographic group by k,







Where Ik is the set of observations in demographic group k and #Ik is the size of Ik. The sim-
ulated deductible provides an exogenous parameterization of the generosity of a state’s Medically
Needy program, with higher values corresponding to less generous programs. Including demo-
graphic groups accounts for the fact that Medically Needy program is less generous to individuals
who belong to wealthier demographic groups.
1.6 Results
1.6.1 Selection from the Medically Needy Program
I begin with qualitative evidence on risk selection in insurance coverage and future Medicaid
utilization. Figure 1.3 presents private insurance coverage (top) and future Medicaid utilization
(bottom) rates, adjusted for year and age, as a function of health risk for individuals in my sample
prior to 2006 and living in states with no policy changes in 2002 or 2004. The left axis is the
share of the population with either insurance coverage or who use Medicaid in the future, while
the right axis is the rate in states with Medically Needy programs minus the rate in states without
such programs. The top graph demonstrates that private insurance coverage is less common for
individuals at higher risk in states with Medically Needy programs, with coverage decreasing from
75% to 65% at the highest level of risk. The relationship between private insurance and risk
for individuals living in states without a Medically Needy program is noisy, with the decrease in
coverage in the middle of the risk distribution reﬂecting a ten percentage point decrease in MedigapChapter 1: Selection and Public Insurance 18
Figure 1.3: Insurance coverage and health
Notes: Graphs are locally weighted average residuals from regression of private insurance coverage (top) or future
Medicaid (bottom) on year and age dummies. Horizontal axis is percentile in the health risk distribution. Line labeled
difference is the Medically Needy minus not Medically Needy locally weighted average residual.Chapter 1: Selection and Public Insurance 19
coverage, while Medicare Advantage coverage rates are steady across the risk distribution (not
shown). The bottom graph demonstrates that there is little difference in future Medicaid utilization
at low levels of health risk. But in the upper half of the risk distribution, future Medicaid utilization
is increasing more rapidly for individuals living in states with Medically Needy programs.
Figure 1.4 illustrates trends over time in private insurance coverage and future Medicaid uti-
Figure 1.4: Time Trends in Private Insurance Coverage and Medicaid Utilization
Note: Point estimates based on full sample, vertical lines are 95% conﬁdence intervals.
lization for individuals living in states with and without Medically Needy programs. Prior to the
introduction of Medicare Part D in 2006, the trends in private insurance coverage are different for
individuals in each set of states. However, this is due solely to differences in Medicare Advan-
tage enrollment—enrollment in Medigap is virtually identical in states with and without Medically
Needy programs in all years. Tends in future Medicaid utilization are similar prior to 2006.Chapter 1: Selection and Public Insurance 20
Figure 1.3 provides qualitative evidence in favor of selection induced by Medically Needy pro-
grams. I begin my quantitative tests by estimating the regression equation in (1.1); the results are
presented in table 1.2. In the odd-numbered columns, I include controls for how supplemental
private insurance plans are priced—gender, smoking status, age, and state23—which permits me
to interpret the coefﬁcients on insurance status as a positive correlation test for asymmetric in-
formation (Chiappori et al., 2006; Chiappori and Salani, 2000). In the even-numbered columns,
I include ﬁxed effects for each demographic group used in constructing the simulated instrument
and marital status, in addition to the covariates in the ﬁrst set of regressions. The ﬁrst two columns
show that private insurance is advantageously selected, consistent with previous work. But, the
next two columns demonstrate that private insurance is advantageously selected only in states with
Medically Needy programs. The introduction of Medicare Part D, which lowered out-of-pocket
spending per unit of health risk, lead to an increase in risk among the privately insured in states
with Medically Needy programs, although this was primarily due to a reduction in risk in states
without Medically Needy programs. These results are consistent with the Medically Needy pro-
gram inducing advantageous selection in the private insurance market.
The next four columns test if the deductible affects risk selection. I instrument for the de-
ductible using the simulated deductible (see Appendix Table 1.B for the ﬁrst stage regressions
associated with estimating (1.2) in table 1.3).24 Overall the coefﬁcients on the deductible and its
interaction with insurance coverage do not provide evidence that the ﬁnancial cost of using the
Medically Needy program is an important contributor to selection. The negative coefﬁcient on the
deductible in column (5) provides an indication that individuals who are wealthier, since wealth is
an important determinant of the deductible, are also healthier, but this effect does not persist after
I include a more exhaustive set of controls for demographic characteristics.
23Medigap plans are priced at the zip code level, but Maestas et al. (2009) ﬁnd very little within-state variation
in premiums, so state ﬁxed effects should be sufﬁcient to control for the prices of contracts that insurers offer to
individuals (Fang et al., 2008).
24The two-stage least squares coefﬁcient estimates on the deductible differ in speciﬁcations that do not include
demographic ﬁxed effects from speciﬁcations that do include demographic ﬁxed effects because of a mechanical
correlation between those ﬁxed effects and the simulated deductible. In the absence of demographic ﬁxed effects, the
local average treatment effect (Angrist et al., 1996) reﬂects two sources of variation—state changes in eligibility rules
and differences between demographic groups—but including demographic ﬁxed effects ensures that the treatment
effect is only due to state changes in eligibility rules. That does not mean that the difference in these two treatment
effects is unimportant, rather these differences demonstrate that individuals who belong to demographic groups that










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Chapter 1: Selection and Public Insurance 22
I next turn to the effect of the Medically Needy program on the decision to purchase private
coverage. Table 1.3 presents results based on the regression in (1.2). The ﬁrst column demonstrates
that the Medically Needy program does not reduce private insurance coverage. Without a change
in private insurance coverage, either higher or lower, the only way to reduce average risk among
the privately insured is if high risk individuals are less likely to purchase insurance, while low risk
individuals are more likely to purchase insurance in states with Medically Needy programs. Col-
umn 2 shows that this is the case—the probability of purchasing private insurance is 4.2 percentage
points lower for a one unit increase in risk. Assuming that the demand for insurance for low risk
individuals is decreasing in price, the implication is that the Medically Needy program reduces
premiums .25
The remaining four columns incorporate the Medically Needy deductible, allowing the effect
of the Medically Needy to vary among individuals for whom the program is more or less generous.
The OLS results (columns 3 and 5) indicate that individuals with higher deductibles are more
likely to have private insurance, although once I instrument for the deductible, using the simulated
deductible, theeffectofthedeductibleisnolongerstatisticallysigniﬁcant. Thedeductiblebecomes
less relevant after the introduction of Medicare Part D because, by lowering the price of risk,
Medicare Part D makes it more difﬁcult to enter the Medically Needy program. The result is that
lower deductible individuals should be more likely, at the margin, to purchase private insurance
after Medicare Part D.
The previous discussion pools results for two distinct types of supplemental insurance. In table
1.4 I present results from estimating (1.1) and (1.2) separately for Medigap and Medicare Advan-
tage coverage. Panel A, which presents results for risk selection from (1.1), suggests that both
types of insurance are advantageously selected in states with Medically Needy programs, but it is
only Medigap plans for which risk is higher in states with higher deductibles. Rather, individu-
als with higher deductibles and Medicare Advantage coverage are healthier than individuals with
lower deductibles. Panel B, corresponding to enrollment based on (1.2), indicates that the Medi-
cally Needy program has offsetting effects on enrollment into Medigap and Medicare Advantage,
although neither are statistically signiﬁcant, and that the bulk of the response to the incentives of
25If the premium were unaffected by the Medically Needy program there would be no effect on enrollment by
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Table 1.4: Effect of Medically Needy Programs on Medigap and Medicare Advantage
Medigap Medicare Advantage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Risk
Medically Needy  Insured -0.035 -0.160 -0.076 0.096
(0.088) (0.111) (0.088) (0.127)
MN  Part D  Insured 0.059 0.168 0.131 0.001
(0.076) (0.156) (0.136) (0.192)
Deductible  Insured 0.027+ -0.039+
(0.014) (0.021)
Deductible  Part D  Insured -0.021 0.028
(0.030) (0.031)
R-squared 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.01
F on excluded instruments 67.9 75.2
Panel B: Enrollment
Medically Needy 0.026 -0.019 -0.022 0.005
(0.032) (0.062) (0.019) (0.050)
MN  Part D -0.026 -0.018 0.011 0.036
(0.024) (0.032) (0.025) (0.033)
Medically Needy  Risk -0.015 -0.028+
(0.023) (0.016)




Deductible  Part D -0.004 -0.010+
(0.006) (0.006)
R-squared 0.17 0.02 0.23 0.01
F on excluded instruments 141.3 141.3
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Notes: Dependent variable in Panel A is the standardized risk score, and in Panel B is an indicator for having the
speciﬁc form of insurance. Insured is an indicator for having the speciﬁed form of supplementary insurance in
addition to Medicare, Part D is an indicator for 2006 and 2008. All models include state, year, and demographic ﬁxed
effects, smoking status, marital status, and a cubic polynomial in age. Instruments for the deductible and its
interactions are the simulated average deductible and its interactions. Standard errors clustered on state in
parentheses.
the Medically Needy program comes from individuals deciding if they will enroll in a Medicare
Advantage plan, or not.Chapter 1: Selection and Public Insurance 25
If individuals are responding to the incentives provided by the Medically Needy program, one
would expect that individuals in states with a Medically Needy program are more likely to use
Medicaid in the future and that future Medicaid users are in worse health now since eligibility
through the Medically Needy program is (partially) dependent on health. Table 1.5 estimates
equations (1.1) and (1.2) for future Medicaid utilization. The ﬁrst three columns demonstrate that
individuals who use Medicaid in the future are systematically less healthy in Medically Needy
states than similar individuals in states without a Medically Needy program—although this trend
reverses with the implementation of Medicare Part D, because future Medicaid users in states
without Medically Needy programs become considerably less healthy after Part D.
Individuals in states with Medically Needy programs are also more likely to use Medicaid
in the future, relative to individuals living in states without such programs. The 2.6 percentage
point increase in utilization, relative to a mean of 6.2%, is large, but it is not implausible given
that more than 30% of the sample does not have any supplemental insurance and an individual is
considered to have used Medicaid if she has used Medicaid for even one month over the previous
two years.26 Assuming that the additional users of Medicaid in the future gain Medicaid coverage
through the Medically Needy program, the increase in utilization, combined with the increase in
average risk, indicates that users of the Medically Needy program are in substantially worse health
now than individuals who do not go on to use the Medically Needy program. The increase in
average risk and the increase in demand given an increase in risk imply that either enrollment is
growing and the growth in enrollment is among individuals who are sicker than the inframarginal
enrollee, or enrollment is falling and the decline is due to individuals who are healthier than the
inframarginal enrollee deciding not to use Medicaid; the increase in future Medicaid utilization
indicates that the marginal users are sicker than the inframarginal enrollees. Lastly, when I control
for the Medically Needy deductible, the effect of risk on insurance coverage is sharply attenuated,
reﬂecting a negative correlation between the deductible and health risk. Given that the deductible
is a function of assets, the implication is that individuals in states with Medically Needy programs
are not engaging in precautionary savings.
I test the ﬁnal implication from Table 1.5—that means-tested public insurance programs distort
26These effects can be scaled to the monthly hazard rate that an individual uses Medicaid, which is 0.27% at the

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Chapter 1: Selection and Public Insurance 27
savings behavior (Hubbard et al., 1995; Kotlikoff, 1986; Levin, 1995)—using (1.3) and present
the estimates in levels for total wealth, countable and exempt assets, and equity in the primary
residence, and countable assets and equity in the primary residence as a share of total wealth in
Table 1.6. The results demonstrate that the Medically Needy program reduces countable assets
and induces a shift in assets towards those that are exempt from the deductible calculation. The
shift towards home equity is not complete, i.e. the growth in exempt assets is not only due to an
increase in home equity. This reﬂects the fact that one can only reduce mortgage debt, which is
the easiest way to increase home equity, up to the outstanding balance of the mortgage. Finally,
the effect of an increase in the simulated deductible indicates that asset shifting is most common
for individuals in demographic groups that should have low deductibles—i.e. those who are most
likely to be able to use the Medically Needy program.
1.6.2 Cognitive Ability and Medically Needy Coverage
Previous research has demonstrated that advantageous selection into Medigap is due to cogni-
tiveability(Fangetal.,2008), however, Fang, Keane, andSilvermandonotidentifythemechanism
by which cognitive ability leads to advantageous selection. I test if the Medically Needy program,
which uses a complex set of procedures to determine eligibility, provides a mechanism by which
cognitive ability leads to advantageous selection. To do so, I interact an index of cognitive abil-
ity with indicators for the Medically Needy program, risk, the Medically Needy deductible, and
Medicare Part D and re-estimate equations (1.1) and (1.2) incorporating these interactions with
ability. The results of this analysis are presented in table 1.7 for both risk selection and demand
for private insurance coverage in states with Medically Needy programs. The results in table 1.7
demonstrate that cognitive ability induces advantageous selection. Cognitive ability is associated
with being lower risk and being more likely to purchase private insurance in states with Medi-
cally Needy programs, but not in other states. This relationship indicates that as long as cognitive
ability is unobserved by the insurer27 then cognitive ability is a source of advantageous selection
27In principle insurers could, in fact, screen on cognitive ability by designing complicated application forms or using
other devices that make the application process or using beneﬁts more complex, however, in the Medigap market this
type of screening by contract is prohibited since all new Medigap contracts must conform to a ﬁxed set of standard
contracts. In the Medicare Advantage market this is a concern and it is known that the greater the number of choices
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Table 1.7: Cognitive Ability, Risk Selection, and Demand for Private Insurance
Risk Insurance Coverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Medically Needy  Insured -0.074 -0.055
(0.060) (0.059)
MN  Part D  Insured 0.035 0.028
(0.102) (0.103)
MN  Ability -0.063+ 0.041** 0.023 0.031
(0.033) (0.015) (0.032) (0.034)
MN  Part D  Ability 0.061 0.008 0.013 -0.007
(0.037) (0.018) (0.033) (0.034)
MN  Risk  Ability -0.016
(0.019)
MN  Part D  Risk  Ability 0.039*
(0.019)
Deductible  Ability 0.002 0.002
(0.007) (0.007)
Deductible  Part D  Ability 0.003 0.003
(0.008) (0.008)
R-squared 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.02 0.02
F on excluded instruments 37.4 39.5
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Notes: Dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the standardized risk score, columns 3-5 is an indicator for having
any private supplemental insurance. Any Private is an indicator for having some form of supplementary insurance in
addition to Medicare, Part D is an indicator for 2006 (2008 is excluded to construct Future Medicaid), MN is
short-hand for Medically Needy. Ability is the ﬁrst principal component from a factor analysis of immediate and
delayed word recall, numeracy, and TICS, see text for details. I carry forward the previous waves numeracy scores, in
order to enlarge the sample. All models include year, state, and demographic group ﬁxed effects, marital status, a
cubic polynomial in age, an indicator for smoking, and main effects for all interactions. Instruments for the
deductible and its interactions are the simulated average deductible and its interactions. Standard errors clustered on
state in parentheses.
(Finkelstein and Poterba, 2006).
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1.6.3 Speciﬁcation Checks and Sensitivities
The top panel of table 1.8 presents sensitivity results for the risk selection regression (1.1),
while the bottom panel presents a comparable array of sensitivities for (1.2). These speciﬁcations
include restricting the sample to individuals living in states that did not have major changes to
their Medically Needy regulations from 2002 to 2008, including only individuals living in states
with Medically Needy programs, and using state-by-year ﬁxed effects and person ﬁxed effects.
Results using only those states that did not change policies yield results that are entirely consistent
with my main speciﬁcation, while results that restrict to individuals living in states with Medically
Needy programs yield identical coefﬁcient estimates, once one accounts for the main effect of
being insured on risk.
Using person-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects provides additional evidence of adverse selection in the pri-
vate supplemental insurance market in states without Medically Needy programs and for (some)
advantageous selection in states with such programs. The coefﬁcients on insurance type are iden-
tiﬁed from within person changes in insurance, hence the positive coefﬁcient on any private insur-
ance in column (8) of the top panel indicates that an individual who has private insurance coverage
is choosing to enroll when she is sicker than her average health status, while the negative coefﬁ-
cient on the Medically Needy interaction with private insurance coverage demonstrates that she is
healthier than her norm when she enrolls in private insurance coverage in states with a Medically
Needy program. However, these selection effects are larger in magnitude than for my base speciﬁ-
cation, which indicates that the person-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects are negatively correlated with average
health status, indicating long-run advantageous selection and short-term adverse selection.2829
28The coefﬁcients on health risk in models with person ﬁxed effects are identiﬁed from individuals who report an
additional condition, age into a new category in the Medicare Advantage risk adjustment regime, or forget to report a
condition in a subsequent survey wave.
29Bolhaar et al. (2012) report adverse selection from short-term health shocks in the Irish health insurance market,
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1.7 Conclusions
In this paper, I show that individuals with private insurance have lower risk scores than do
those without private insurance in states that have a Medically Needy program, but in other states
privately insured individuals are higher risk than those without private insurance. These results
demonstrate that the Medically Needy program is inducing high-risk individuals to select out of the
private market. I also demonstrate that individuals who use Medicaid over the next two years are
less healthy in states with Medically Needy programs than in other states. The increased utilization
of the Medicaid program is also reﬂected in a shift in asset holdings towards home equity, which
are typically ignored when determining eligibility for Medicaid.
These results show that advantageous selection not only results from variations in beliefs and
preferences, but also reﬂects the availability of public insurance. In the case that I study, advanta-
geous selection occurs from a rational response to the incentives provided by the Medically Needy
program. The consequences of these institutions for social welfare is an important topic for future
research and in the design of optimal policies. Particular weight should be given to determining
if having a Medically Needy program is, on net, welfare improving, and identifying the optimal
“deductible,” or other risk-sharing mechanism.Chapter 1: Selection and Public Insurance 34
1.A Estimating Certainty Equivalent and Willingness to Pay
for Insurance
I use data on individuals who were 65 and older with Medicare coverage, but without Medi-
caid or employer sponsored insurance, from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey for the period
2000-2008 to estimate the certainty equivalent of various insurance alternatives and the willingness
to pay for Medigap coverage. Using self-reported diagnoses I constructed a health risk index that
is similar to the index in my main analysis (see Appendix Table 1.A for diagnoses and weights).
Because of some extreme outliers in the risk distribution, I capped the distribution at twice the
mean.30 I use total spending by service (hospital inpatient, home health, and outpatient) and cor-
responding cost-sharing rules ($1,030 deductible for inpatient spending, no cost-sharing for home
health, and 20% coinsurance for outpatient spending) to calculate service-speciﬁc cost sharing and
then I sum these estimates to arrive at the total amount of spending individuals can avert with
Medigap coverage (I assumed no insurance coverage for other spending types).
I calculated certainty equivalents assuming a CARA utility function, so that I could ignore
consumption, with a coefﬁcient of absolute risk aversion of 0.0000131. For each individual,
the contribution to utility from spending mi is  exp(ami), where a is the coefﬁcient of ab-
solute risk aversion and an individual’s distribution of spending is deﬁned by actual spending
by other individuals in a neighborhood of an individual’s health risk. The certainty equivalent
solves  exp( a(K CE)) =  åiexp( a(K mi)) and willingness to pay is CEAlternative  
CEMedigap. The ﬁgure is insensitive to using coefﬁcients of absolute risk aversion corresponding
to coefﬁcients of relative risk aversion in the range of 0.5 to 3.
1.B Alternative Deductible Coding
The empirical work in the body of the paper makes two simpliﬁcations which, at ﬁrst glance,
are not obviously correct. First, I code the deductible for individuals living in states without a
30 Omitting the cap did not change the results below a risk score of 2.3, but there was an increase in the willingness
to pay at higher risk scores ( people out of 16,000).
31 At the median total wealth, this corresponds to a coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion of 1.Chapter 1: Selection and Public Insurance 35
Medically Needy program as 0, although in reality their deductible is ¥. Second, my empirical
speciﬁcationsin(1.1)and(1.2)areinterpretedasdifference-in-differencesestimates, althoughthey
are not written as such. The essential difﬁculty in writing the speciﬁcation as a standard difference-
in-differences estimator is that the deductible and the Medically Needy dummy are co-linear when
I also include their interaction. To see this, it is useful to ﬁrst recode the deductible so that it
is always ﬁnite. I deﬁne an alternate deductible as AltDeductist = (1 exp( Deductist)), which
is 1 in states without a Medically Needy program and is 0 for individuals who have no need to
spend down to enter the Medically Needy program in their state. Now consider the difference-in-
differences model:
yist = b0+b1MNst +b2AltDeductist +b3MNst AltDeductist (1.4)
Where yist is an arbitrary outcome and MNst is a dummy for living in a state with a Medically
Needy program. I claim that (1.4) is not identiﬁed because:
MNst = 1 (AltDeductist  MNst AltDeductist) (1.5)
The ﬁrst term in parentheses in (1.5) is one in states without Medically Needy programs, while the
second term is zero; the second term equals the ﬁrst term in states with Medically Needy programs,
so that the right hand side of the expression is always one in states with a Medically Needy program
and zero otherwise.
In appendix table 1.C I estimate versions of (1.1) and (1.2) using the alternative deductible
coding (i.e. based on the speciﬁcation in (1.4)) excluding the Medically Needy dummy and its
interaction with the introduction of Medicare Part D (odd columns) and excluding the main effect
of the alternative deductible and its interaction with the introduction of Medicare Part D (even
columns). None of the qualitative conclusions are affected by this coding, although it is more
difﬁculty to interpret the coefﬁcients on the alternative deductible.32 In addition, the coefﬁcients
on insurance coverage in the health risk regressions (columns 1 and 2) match each other and are
almost identical to the corresponding coefﬁcients in column (6) of table 1.2; likewise the coefﬁ-
32One can differentiate (1.4) with respect to the deductible to get
¶yist
¶Deductist
= (b2+b3MNst)exp( Deductist), which does not have a natural economic interpretation.Chapter 1: Selection and Public Insurance 36
cients on risk in the private insurance (columns 3 and 4) and future Medicaid (5 and 6) match the
corresponding coefﬁcients on risk in column (6) of table 1.3 and column (6) of table 1.5.Chapter 2
Ex Ante Moral Hazard from the Medicaid
Medically Needy Program
2.1 Introduction
It is well known that insurance distorts behavior both before (ex-ante moral hazard) and after a
loss (ex-post moral hazard) (Ehrlich and Becker, 1972; Pauly, 1968; Spence and Zeckhauser, 1971;
Zweifel and Manning, 2000). Ex-ante moral hazard manifests as a reduction in self-protection,
compared to an individual’s behavior without insurance, while ex-post moral hazard, in the health
insurance setting, increases the consumption of medical care (Manning et al., 1987). In both cases,
insurance distorts a consumer’s choices by putting a wedge between the private and social marginal
costs and beneﬁts of her choices, which reduces the welfare gains from insurance.
However, the welfare consequences of ex-ante moral hazard can be ameliorated. If insurers can
adjust premiums according to self-protective investments, then consumers will internalize the ben-
eﬁts of risk reduction (Ehrlich and Becker, 1972). But, if insurers can not use self-protection when
setting premiums, Ellis and Manning (2007) and Goldman and Philipson (2007) show that insuring
self-protection is optimal1 since consumers will respond to the lower price for self-protection by
1This is not explicit in Goldman and Philipson (2007), which is primarily concerned with insurance coverage of
substitute goods and services, but one can conceive of self-protection as a substitute for treatment, in which case
self-protection should be insured.
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increasing self-protection.2 In the extreme case, insurers may want to pay policy-holders to en-
gage in self-protection,3 which yields an approximation to Ehrlich and Becker’s (1972) outcome4
since consumers will, in effect, be paying different premiums depending upon contemporaneous
investments in self-protection.
Despite the clear theoretical importance of ex-ante moral hazard, empirical evidence of ex-ante
moral hazard has been limited, mostly because identiﬁcation is difﬁcult as individuals self select
into different insurance arrangements.5
A number of papers exploit the discontinuous increase in Medicare coverage in the United
States when an individual turns 65 using outcomes that are insensitive to cost-sharing—principally
weight, smoking rates, alcohol consumption, and exercise—since Medicare also affects the out-
of-pocket cost of preventive care. Card et al. (2004) uses an explicit regression discontinuity to
identify ex-ante moral hazard6 ﬁnding weak evidence of ex-ante moral hazard with an increase
in the probability of being overweight or obese for speciﬁc subgroups of the population (low-
education minorities, non-Hispanic Blacks, and men (obese only)). However, the small magnitude
of these results is not surprising since smoking is addictive and weight reﬂects an accumulated
energy imbalance, which can not easily be changed in the short-run. Dave and Kaestner (2009)
distinguish between direct and indirect effects of insurance on self-protection, where the latter is
affected by interactions with the health care system. Using data from the Health and Retirement
2I.e. ex-post moral hazard can be used to reduce the ex-ante moral hazard problem.
3There are practical problems with this approach since, by assumption, self-protection is not contractible, so a
“truth-telling” constraint may prevent insurers from making payments to policy-holders (Ma and McGuire, 1997).
4This is only an approximation since there may be excess self-protection, hence the resulting outcome is only
second-best efﬁcient.
5The analogy to identifying ex-post moral hazard is obvious, but the identiﬁcation strategies differ since one iden-
tiﬁes how demand for health care responds to the price change brought about by insurance to estimate ex-post moral
hazard, but one is concerned with changes in self-protection due to risk protection for ex-ante moral hazard.
6The basic idea is that individuals who are just under age 65 do not (in general) have access to Medicare insurance,
but individuals who have just turned 65 do have access to insurance coverage from Medicare, but these two popula-
tions are, for all intents and purposes, identical. However, making inferences from aging into Medicare assumes that
the change in the treatment, in this case insurance coverage, is monotonic, which is manifestly true for individuals
who were uninsured prior to turning 65, but may be false for individuals who are switching from private insurance
to Medicare since they are getting less insurance from Medicare than from private insurance (Kaiser Family Founda-
tion, 2008). As a result the change in an outcome at the discontinuity reﬂects moral hazard from individuals getting
insurance, but is offset by individuals receiving less generous insurance coverage, so the treatment effects are biased
towards zero.Chapter 2: Ex Ante Moral Hazard from the Medicaid Medically Needy Program 39
Survey, they ﬁnd no evidence that individuals who gained insurance coverage as a result of aging
into Medicare reduced their self-protective investments (exercise, smoking, and alcohol consump-
tion), particularly when compared to behavior immediately prior to entering Medicare.
de Preux (2011) further extends the basic Ehrlich and Becker (1972) model by considering how
individuals alter self-protective investments in light of anticipated changes in insurance coverage.7
In the Health and Retirement Survey, de Preux ﬁnds that there is a break in the trend in physical
activity when individuals turn 65, which he interprets as evidence of ex-ante moral hazard, but if
one ignores a sharp dip in physical activity for individuals who are 63 or 64, there is no change in
the trend in physical activity at 65.
Stanciole (2008) instruments for private health insurance coverage, rather than using individu-
als aging in to Medicare coverage to identify ex-ante moral hazard in the Panel Study on Income
Dynamics. Estimates from a multinomial probit regression indicates that insurance coverage in-
creases the probability of smoking, being sedentary, and being obese, all of which are consistent
with ex-ante moral hazard. But it is unclear how to interpret these results since the instrument is
an index of arthritis, emotional problems, and decline in mental ability, which have direct effects
on physical activity and, therefore, obesity, and individuals may smoke in order to alleviate mental
distress.
In this paper, I use variation in risk protection among individuals with Medicare coverage from
Medicaid Medically Needy programs, which provide public catastrophic insurance coverage, but
provide no protection against small risks. The structure of the program, which provides a person-
speciﬁc deductible, allows me to instrument for the amount of risk protection provided by the
program using a simulated instrument (Currie and Gruber, 1996). Ex-ante moral hazard implies
that individuals with higher deductibles should make greater investments in self-protection, all
else equal. I ﬁnd that individuals at greater ﬁnancial risk are more likely to be normal weight
(body mass index < 25) and to quit smoking, with stronger effects for women than for men. In
addition, introducing a public catastrophic insurance program reduces the likelihood an individual
quits smoking and makes women less likely to screen for cervical or breast cancer. However,
7“Anticipatory” ex ante moral hazard reduces the effect of aging into Medicare and would be indicated by dif-
ferences in the trends of unhealthy behaviors prior to aging into Medicare, compared to after an individual has aged
into Medicare, for individuals without insurance prior to entering Medicare compared to those with insurance prior to
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men become more likely to screen for prostate cancer, but only if they have supplemental private
insurance.
2.2 Theory
The theory underlying ex-ante moral hazard is well-established with numerous presentations
of the basic results; the presentation below follows Ehrlich and Becker (1972) with some modiﬁ-
cations from Dave and Kaestner (2009).
Assumingthatconsumersmaximizeexpectedutility, thatincomeisgivenbyIs, wheresindexes
loss (0 for no loss, 1 for loss) with I1 < I0, preventive effort is denoted by r, and prevention affects




,8 then expected utility
is:
p(r)u(I1 r)+(1  p(r))u(I0 r) (2.1)
In this framework, the optimal choice of prevention satisﬁes:
p0(r)(u(I1 r) u(I0 r)) = (1  p(r))u0(I0 r)+ p(r)u0(I1 r) (2.2)
As has been noted elsewhere (Dave and Kaestner, 2009; Ehrlich and Becker, 1972), the left-hand
side of the ﬁrst order condition is the return to prevention—the reduction in the probability of
falling ill multiplied by the utility gain of not falling ill—while the right-hand side corresponds to
the forgone utility to invest in prevention.
I extend this basic model, and follow Dave and Kaestner (2009), by introducing a public insur-
ance scheme that provides a payment, q, in the event of illness, yielding expected utility and the
ﬁrst-order condition:
p(r)u(I1+q r)+(1  p(r))u(I0 r) (2.1’)
p0(r)(u(I1+q r) u(I0 r)) = (1  p(r))u0(I0 r)+ p(r)u0(I1+q r) (2.2’)
8This condition is sufﬁcient, but not necessary, to ensure that the second order condition is satisﬁed.Chapter 2: Ex Ante Moral Hazard from the Medicaid Medically Needy Program 41











Where D < 0 is the second derivative of the utility function. Solving (2.2’) for p0(r) (assuming









Where u(0) is shorthand for u(I0 r) and u(1) is shorthand for u(I1+q r). Substituting in the
ﬁrst order Taylor series approximations u0(1) u0(0)   u00(1)(I0  I1  q) and u(1) u(0) 






. Therefore, for risk averse individuals,
for whom u00(c) < 0, an increase in public insurance coverage decreases self-protection and the
introduction of a new public insurance program should, likewise, decrease self-protection.
2.3 Institutional Background
Medicare is the principal source of insurance for individuals over the age of 65 in the United
States, but it only covers certain goods and services. The program is divided into four parts:
Part A provides insurance for hospital expenses and home health; Part B pays for physician and
outpatient expenses; Part C, also known as Medicare Advantage, provides a private alternative to
Parts A and B using managed care as a substitute for cost-sharing to constrain utilization; and
Part D provides prescription drug coverage through subsidized private plans. Most individuals
receive Part A coverage by virtue of having paid into the system while working and purchase Part
B coverage (>95% of Medicare Part A enrollees also have Part B coverage); Parts C and D charge
premiums based on a formula that depends on the cost of insuring the average individual, relative
to a benchmark.9 In addition to premiums, payroll taxes, and general revenue funds, Medicare
9Parts C and D use different methods to construct benchmarks. The Part C benchmark is essentially set by Congress
(McGuire et al., 2011), while the Part D benchmark is based on costs of an insurer’s competitors, providing a form ofChapter 2: Ex Ante Moral Hazard from the Medicaid Medically Needy Program 42
Parts A and B use cost-sharing10 both to lower costs and limit utilization.
Complementing Medicare are a variety of private and public insurance programs. Many Medi-
care beneﬁciaries purchase either supplemental insurance that pays some, or all, of the cost-sharing
and may cover additional services or enroll in Medicare Part C plans. In about 30% of cases, pre-
vious employers provide supplemental coverage. But many individuals may choose to rely solely
on public insurance plans, or may rely on a combination of public and private coverage in the event
of severe health shocks.
Public insurance, which is primarily provided by state Medicaid programs, provides coverage
that is comparable to the private insurance plans (i.e. the Medicaid program makes cost-sharing
payments on the individual’s behalf), but is subject to stringent eligibility requirements, including
low income and asset thresholds. But, some states also include “Medically Needy” programs,
which provide public insurance coverage to individuals who have spent most of their assets11 and
whose income, net of medical expenses, is below a speciﬁc threshold. These features implicitly
deﬁne a “deductible,” which I use as a measure of the ﬁnancial risk protection provided by the
state Medically Needy program. Unlike a traditional deductible, this deductible is a life time
deductible because the deductible is almost always determined by an individual’s assets. After the
individual has medical expenses exceeding her deductible she is eligible for Medicare coverage
through the Medically Needy program.12 Figure 2.1 presents the Medically Needy asset limits for
2000 and 2008, which demonstrates that there has been little variation over time in these limits,
withtheexceptionofNewYorkwhichmorethantripledtheassetlimitin2008. However, anumber
of states made other notable changes—Arizona introduced a program in 2001,13 Oklahoma and
Oregon terminated their programs in 2002, and Tennessee froze enrollment in 2005 but reopened
yardstick competition (Shleifer, 1985).
10In 2005, consumers paid $912 per discharge for hospital care (with additional payments for stays longer than 60
days), a $110 annual Part B deductible, and 20% coinsurance for Part B services.
11Most Medically Needy programs consider all assets except the primary home, usually one car, and household
goods.
12Medicare Part D, which took effect on January 1, 2006, interacts with the Medically Needy program by reducing
an individual’s prescription drug spending, which makes it less likely that an individual will enter the Medically Needy
program.
13Technically this program is not a Medically Needy program, but it is sufﬁciently similar that I classify it as a
Medically Needy program.Chapter 2: Ex Ante Moral Hazard from the Medicaid Medically Needy Program 43
Figure 2.1: Medically Needy Asset Limits for Single Individuals
Notes: Based on state regulatory codes and Kaiser Family Foundation (2003, 2009).
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2.4 Data
Data for this study come from the core surveys of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS),
which is a longitudinal survey of more than 30,000 individuals near or in retirement. The initial
sample was recruited in 1992 and intended to be representative of the population over 50. Over
time, the initial cohort has aged, so additional cohorts were recruited in 1998 and 2004 keeping
the sample representative of the U.S. population over the age of 50. I use data from the 2000
through 2008 cores waves of the survey. I restrict the sample to individuals 65 and older with
Medicare Parts A and B (or Medicare Part C) coverage, who do not have supplemental insurance
from a former employer or the military and who are not currently enrolled in Medicaid. I deﬁne
employer-sponsored insurance as any non-drug insurance plan that is purchased from or provided
by an individual’s former employer, a spouse’s current or former employer, or the employer or
union of a previous spouse. I exclude anyone with a proxy respondent or who failed to provide a
complete interview.
I use imputed asset and income data from RAND to measure total wealth, countable assets,
exempt assets, and earned and unearned income. I deﬁne exempt assets as equity in the primary
residence, vehicles,14 and other assets (primarily household goods). Countable assets are all other
assets, net of debt. All dollar ﬁgures are converted to real 2010 dollars using the CPI-U.
I restrict my sample to individuals whose Social Security income exceeds the SSI threshold
(making them ineligible for most non-Medically Needy Medicaid programs) and have countable
assets that are less than $200,000 (making it at least plausible that they will exceed their deductible
in their lifetime).
Data on state Medically Needy programs come from a variety of sources including surveys by
the Kaiser Family Foundation (2003, 2009) and by reviewing state regulatory codes; ofﬁcials from
state Medicaid agencies clariﬁed any disagreements between sources. In order to map state rules
onto asset data, I restrict the sample to unmarried individuals living alone and married individuals
living in two-person households. I exclude individuals living in Hawaii because I was unable to
get sufﬁcient historical information on their Medically Needy program.
I use several measures of self-protection and for the regressions I code each measure so that
14Most Medically Needy programs only permit individuals to exempt one vehicle, but the HRS asks about all
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higher values are more protective. The measures I look at are being obese (deﬁned as a body
mass index  30), being overweight (BMI 25), having a drinking problem,15 smoking, getting a
cholesterol test, getting a ﬂu shot, and three gender speciﬁc tests for cancer—prostate exams, mam-
mograms, and Pap smears—in the previous two years. Finally, I construct an index of preventive
behaviors as the average of the indicators for being overweight, having an alcohol problem, smok-
ing, getting a cholesterol test, and ﬂu vaccination, which I then normalize to a mean 0, variance 1
variable.
2.5 Empirical Methods and Identiﬁcation
The theoretical background predicts that for risk averse individuals self-protection is decreas-
ing as insurance coverage increases. I use the Medically Needy program to provide exogenous
variation in insurance coverage—in this case, the amount of spending needed to enter the program,
which corresponds to I0  I1  q.16 This value is essentially a deductible and I will refer to the
amount of spending needed to enter the program as such in the remainder of the paper.
My empirical approach consists of regressing self-protective investments on the deductible
in the Medically Needy program, along with a dummy for the state having a Medically Needy
program, which also captures the fact that the deductible is inﬁnite in states without a Medically
Needy program.17 For a given investment by individual i in state s and year t, Iist, the regression
is:
Iist = b1Deductist +b2Deductist PartDt +b3MNst +b4MNst PartDt
+XistG+ss+tt +eist
(2.4)
In the preceding expression, Deductist is the “deductible”, PartDt is a dummy for 2006 and later,
MNst is an indicator for living in a state with a Medically Needy program, Xist is a vector of
15Deﬁned as consuming more than four drinks in a day for men, three drinks in a day for women, or fourteen drinks
in a week for men and women (NIAAA, 2012) .
16The loss that an individual can suffer is given by I0  I1, so the individual only pays that amount of the loss less
the payment provided by the public insurance program, or I0 I1 q.
17I code the deductible in these states as 0. See Appendix 2.A for an alternative coding scheme and demonstrates
the formal equivalence between the speciﬁcation in (2.4) and the standard difference-in-differences model.Chapter 2: Ex Ante Moral Hazard from the Medicaid Medically Needy Program 46
individual characteristics and I include state (ss) and year (tt) ﬁxed effects. The “deductible”
is a measure of insurance generosity providing variation in the intensive margin of insurance,
while living in a state with a Medically Needy program proxies for the extensive margin. Given
the theoretical prediction that greater public insurance reduces self-protection, one can sign the
coefﬁcients in the regression to indicate ex-ante moral hazard. One would expect b1 > 0 and
b3 < 0 since higher deductibles increase risk, while Medically Needy programs reduce risk; the
introduction of Medicare Part D should, broadly speaking, make it harder to enter the Medically
Needy program since individuals have strong incentives to enroll in prescription drug coverage,18
which effectively makes the Medically Needy program less generous, hence I expect b2 < 0 and
b4 > 0. The coefﬁcients can also indicate the presence of ex-post moral hazard as individuals
increase consumption in order to reduce their deductible in the future (Aron-Dine et al., 2012),
in which case b1 < 0, b2 > 0, and b3 > 0; the sign of b4 is ambiguous since individuals who
expect to use the Medically Needy program may increase usage when it becomes harder to enter
the program, but individuals may also respond to the increased difﬁculty of entering the program
by reducing ex-post moral hazard.
There are a variety of reasons why the “deductible” is likely to be endogenous in the proposed
regression. Individuals may respond to the incentives provided by the Medically Needy program
and either increase the rate at which they are dissaving or alter the composition of their assets
into assets that are not included in the deductible calculation. Second, asset holdings are likely
to be mismeasured, which will bias estimates towards the null. Third, individuals who invest in
self-protection may also invest in other forms of human capital, which will affect both earnings
and savings. In light of these reasons for worrying about the endogeneity of the deductible, I
will, following Currie and Gruber (1996) and Mahoney (2012), instrument for the deductible (and
its interaction with Medicare Part D) using a simulated deductible. I construct the instrument by
dividing the population into K demographic groups based on exogenous characteristics (I use age
group—65 to 69, 70 to 74, 75 to 79, and 80 or older—, gender, race, and education). For each state
18The Federal government pays 74:5% of the costs of the program, on average, and Medicare Part D imposes
penalties for individuals who do not enroll at their ﬁrst opportunityChapter 2: Ex Ante Moral Hazard from the Medicaid Medically Needy Program 47






Where Ik is the set of observations in demographic group k, #Ik is the size of Ik, and D(;) is a
function that maps an individual’s income and asset holdings, Ai, to a deductible by applying the
state- and year-speciﬁc rules, Rst. This measure parameterizes the generosity of a state’s Medically
Needy program in a consistent manner. Further, by including ﬁxed effects for each demographic
group and state, I identify the effect of differences in ﬁnancial risk from within-state differences in
behavior.
2.6 Results
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics on my sample. On average, individuals have to spend
almost $45,000 in order to be eligible for Medicaid coverage through the Medically Needy pro-
gram, although the average is considerably higher than the median deductible of $20,300. Both the
averageandmediandeductiblesareconsiderablylargerthantheaveragedeductibleinanemployer-
sponsored high-deductible insurance plan.19 But most of the deductible for the Medically Needy
program can be satisﬁed by increasing one’s consumption since the deductible is based on an in-
dividual’s assets and income. In addition, individuals can (and do) shift assets to types that are
exempt from the deductible calculation (see Chapter 1).
The measures of health care utilization—any doctor visit, any hospitalization, and any prescrip-
tion drug use—are fairly high, which is what one would expect given that senior citizens are sicker
than the general population. The self-protective measures do not vary substantially between states
with and without Medically Needy programs. On the remaining demographic characteristics there
are few differences between individuals living in states with and without Medically Needy pro-
grams, although individuals in states with Medically Needy programs are almost a full year older
than individuals living in non-Medically Needy states and are more likely to consume alcohol.
19In 2011 the average deductible in an employer-sponsored high-deductible insurance plan was $1,908 (Kaiser
Family Foundation, 2011).Chapter 2: Ex Ante Moral Hazard from the Medicaid Medically Needy Program 48
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Medically Needy states Non Medically Needy states
Mean Stan. Dev. Mean Stan. Dev.
Deductible 44971 52485 0 .
Simulated deductible 45341 18324 0 .
Any doctor visit 0.95 0.21 0.94 0.23
Any hospital stay 0.32 0.47 0.32 0.47
Any prescription 0.88 0.33 0.88 0.33
BMI 27.1 5.2 27.0 5.1
Obese 0.25 0.43 0.23 0.42
Overweight or Obese 0.64 0.48 0.63 0.48
Smoke 0.17 0.37 0.18 0.38
Drink 0.43 0.50 0.36 0.48
Drinking problem 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.28
Exercise 0.18 0.39 0.17 0.38
Flu shot 0.74 0.44 0.74 0.44
Cholesterol test 0.85 0.35 0.82 0.39
Prostate exam 0.76 0.42 0.77 0.42
Mammogram 0.68 0.47 0.66 0.48
Pap smear 0.44 0.50 0.42 0.49
Preventive index 0.00 0.99 0.00 1.02
Age 75.5 7.5 74.7 7.2
Marital status
Married 0.50 0.50 0.55 0.50
Separated/Divorced 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.29
Widowed 0.39 0.49 0.35 0.48
Never married 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.12
Education
Less than high school 0.28 0.45 0.27 0.44
High school 0.55 0.50 0.56 0.50
Any college 0.11 0.32 0.11 0.31
More than college 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.24
Race/Ethnicity
White 0.80 0.40 0.80 0.40
Black 0.13 0.33 0.11 0.31
Hispanic 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.27
Other race 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.08
Female 0.52 0.50 0.50 0.50
Private insurance 0.46 0.50 0.43 0.50
Cognitive ability 0.00 1.01 -0.01 0.98Chapter 2: Ex Ante Moral Hazard from the Medicaid Medically Needy Program 49
2.6.1 Utilization
I begin my analysis by considering the effect of the Medically Needy program on the likelihood
that an individual uses Medicaid over the next two years and has seen a physician, went to the
hospital, orusedprescriptiondrugsovertheprevioustwoyears. Theseresultsarepresentedintable
2.2. The ﬁrst column demonstrates that individuals living in states with Medically Needy programs
Table 2.2: Utilization Effects of the Medically Needy Program
(1) (2) (3) (4)




Medically Needy 0.024 0.032* 0.048 -0.063**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.063) (0.024)
MN  Part D 0.009 -0.014 -0.059+ 0.056**
(0.026) (0.015) (0.031) (0.019)
Deductible -0.003 -0.002 -0.006 0.008+
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005)
Deductible  Part D -0.005 -0.001 0.009 -0.007*
(0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
N 8614 13005 12976 13005
F on excluded instruments 541.1 774.2 766.5 774.2
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Notes: Dependent variable indicated by column heading. Medically Needy is an indicator for living in a state with a
Medically Needy program; MN is short-hand for Medically Needy. Deductible is the amount the individual must
spend to be eligible for Medically Needy coverage. Part D is an indicator for 2006 or after. Results from 2SLS
regressions, instrumenting for the Deductible and Deductible  Part D using the simulated deductible and the
simulated deductible  Part D. All models include state, year, and demographic group ﬁxed effects, a cubic
polynomial in age, and marital status. Standard errors clustered on state in parentheses.
are no more likely to use Medicaid in the future.20 The next three columns present results for
utilization, which are a priori ambiguous, because the Medically Needy program reduces private
insurance coverage (chapter 1), which would be expected to reduce the likelihood of receiving
medical care (Manning et al., 1987). But, as long as individuals are not completely myopic, the
ability to lower the deductible in the future provides an incentive to increase utilization (Aron-Dine
et al., 2012; Keeler et al., 1977).
20In chapter 1, I show that the Medically Needy program does increase future utilization of Medicaid, but that once
I account for the deductible the main effect of the Medically Needy program is no longer statistically signiﬁcantChapter 2: Ex Ante Moral Hazard from the Medicaid Medically Needy Program 50
The effects of the Medically Needy program on doctor and hospital care are consistent with
ex-post moral hazard, although in neither case are all of the results correctly signed. However,
the main effects indicate that introducing a Medically Needy program increases the likelihood of
a doctor’s visit. Second, when Medically Needy programs become less attractive, because the
introduction of Medicare Part D reduces the likelihood of using the Medically Needy program,
hospital utilization falls.
Prescription drug utilization, however, exhibits a pattern of results that are consistent with ex-
ante, rather than ex-post, moral hazard. Individuals are less likely to use prescription drugs when a
Medically Needy program is introduced, but become more likely with the introduction of Medicare
Part D, and individuals who face larger ﬁnancial costs to use the Medically Needy program are
initially more likely to use prescription drugs, but are no more likely to use prescription drugs
after Medicare Part D takes effect. To the extent that prescription drugs are costly and only reduce
the probability of illness, but not the magnitude of any loss, then prescription drugs act like self
protection and should be reduced by the Medically Needy program.
2.6.2 Ex-Ante Moral Hazard
I now turn to the existence of ex-ante moral hazard. In the remaining tables, the dependent
variables are coded so that higher values correspond to more protection. Table 2.3 presents the
result of estimating my main speciﬁcation for indicators of self-protective behaviors—being obese,
being overweight or obese, having a drinking problem, smoking, cholesterol testing, receiving a
ﬂu shot, and an index of these behaviors—for both men and women combined. In the interests of
space, I only report results in which I instrument for the deductible with the simulated deductible.
All regressions include controls for demographic groups, age, marital status, and state and year.
Standard errors are clustered on the state.
The results provide clear evidence of ex-ante moral hazard, with the index of preventive be-
haviors indicating a sharp decrease in self-protection after Medically Needy coverage is made
available. The positive coefﬁcient on the deductible implies that there is less moral hazard for
individuals at greater ﬁnancial risk, or for whom the program is less generous. The preventive
index summarizes the results in the ﬁrst six columns, all but two of which have coefﬁcients that are
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care coverage that took effect in 2005.21 Among the individual measures, smoking provides clear
evidence of ex ante moral hazard, while there is a decrease in the probability of being overweight
for individuals with higher deductibles.
Table 2.4 present comparable results for men (Panel A) and women (Panel B). The results for
men indicate that men who are overweight increase their weight after a Medically Needy program
takes effect, which is indicative of ex-ante moral hazard, but with the exception of smoking, the
remaining results are inconsistent with ex-ante moral hazard.
Women present a more nuanced story, particularly with regard to weight. After 2006, when
Medicare Part D took effect, women appear to be splitting into two groups in states with Med-
ically Needy programs—some women become obese in response to the incentives provided by
the program, while other women lose weight. The remaining results indicate that prior to 2006,
low deductible women did not decrease their self-protective investments and higher deductible
women undertook more self-protective investments. But after 2006, women with low deductibles
increased their self protection, while women with higher deductibles cut back on self-protection.
These results are, for the most part, consistent with ex-ante moral hazard.
When I stratify the sample on insurance coverage (table 2.5) I ﬁnd consistent evidence of ex
antemoralhazardforindividualsbothwith(PanelA)andwithoutsupplementalinsurancecoverage
(Panel B). Although, individuals with supplemental insurance were more likely to get a cholesterol
test and more likely to be overweight or obese, while individuals without any other insurance
exhibit ex ante moral hazard for cholesterol testing, in addition to smoking, and other preventive
behaviors.
Given that the Medically Needy program principally provides protection against very large
health shocks, one would expect to see effects on cancer screening rates since cancer is extremely
costly and many individuals will exceed the Medically Needy deductible if they are diagnosed
with cancer.22 In table 2.6 I show that women are less likely to screen for cervical or breast cancer
21Prior to 2005, individuals had to make cost-sharing payments for cholesterol testing, so getting a cholesterol test
serves to reduce one’s future deductible. Beginning in 2005 Medicare stopped requiring these payments provided that
the cholesterol tests were done for screening purposes and no more than once every ﬁve years. Hence, one should see
ex-post moral hazard prior to 2005 and ex-ante moral hazard after 2005.
22The total costs, not only out-of-pocket costs, for an individual newly diagnosed with cancer ranges from $20,000
to $45,000 in the ﬁrst year (Mariotto et al., 2011), depending on the type of cancer, and a cancer diagnoses increases
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when a Medically Needy program is introduced and these results are essentially unchanged when I
look at women with supplemental insurance and those without supplemental insurance separately.
However, men are more likely, rather than less likely, to screen for prostate cancer.
Table 2.6: Cancer Screening and the Medically Needy Program
All Insured Uninsured
Panel A: Pap Smears
Medically Needy -0.250** -0.223** -0.392**
(0.049) (0.083) (0.078)
MN  Part D 0.082 0.057 0.085
(0.053) (0.075) (0.078)
Deductible 0.008 0.009 0.020
(0.011) (0.017) (0.020)
Deductible  Part D -0.017+ -0.014 -0.016
(0.010) (0.014) (0.017)
Panel B: Mammograms
Medically Needy -0.110* -0.120 -0.102
(0.055) (0.089) (0.204)
MN  Part D 0.015 0.067 -0.082
(0.039) (0.058) (0.058)
Deductible -0.001 0.002 0.014
(0.011) (0.015) (0.019)
Deductible  Part D -0.007 -0.006 -0.015
(0.008) (0.012) (0.018)
Panel C: Prostate Exams
Medically Needy 0.069 0.168** -0.088
(0.057) (0.060) (0.179)
MN  Part D -0.084* -0.159** -0.009
(0.042) (0.056) (0.059)
Deductible 0.001 -0.011 0.019
(0.005) (0.008) (0.015)
Deductible  Part D 0.014* 0.021* 0.007
(0.006) (0.009) (0.012)
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Notes: Dependent variable indicated by column heading. Medically Needy is an indicator for living in a state with a
Medically Needy program; MN is short-hand for Medically Needy. Deductible is the amount the individual must
spend to be eligible for Medically Needy coverage. Part D is an indicator for 2006 or after. Results from 2SLS
regressions, instrumenting for the Deductible and Deductible  Part D using the simulated deductible and the
simulated deductible  Part D. All models include state, year, and demographic group ﬁxed effects, a cubic
polynomial in age, and marital status. Standard errors clustered on state in parentheses.Chapter 2: Ex Ante Moral Hazard from the Medicaid Medically Needy Program 56
2.7 Conclusions
Theorypredictsthatinsurance, byprovidingrisk-protection, reducesanindividual’sinvestment
in risk-reducing activities because the return to risk reduction is shared between the individual and
the insurer (ex-ante moral hazard). This effect can manifest in a variety of ways; in the health in-
surance context one would expect an increase in smoking and drinking for individuals with greater
risk protection, and a decrease in testing for disease and vaccination rates. Previous efforts to test
for ex-ante moral hazard have relied on exogenous changes in insurance coverage, which affects
both the price of medical care and risk protection. In this paper, I have used variation in risk
protection provided by public catastrophic insurance programs. These programs only affect risk
protection, leaving the marginal out-of-pocket cost of medical care unaffected. Using a simulated
deductible to instrument for the actual deductible, I demonstrate that ﬁnancial risk increases self-
protective investments. Individuals with greater risk exposure are more likely to have a body mass
index < 25 and to quit smoking. In addition, introducing a public catastrophic insurance program
reduces the likelihood an individual quits smoking and makes women less likely to screen for cer-
vical or breast cancer, while men become more likely to screen for prostate cancer, but only if they
have supplemental private insurance.
These results also highlight two conﬂicting policy goals in the United States—increasing insur-
ance coverage, while simultaneously improving the health of the nation, particularly with regards
tosmokingandobesity. Forexample, theAffordableCareActeliminatescost-sharingforanumber
of preventive health measures, which will have the effect, even if it was not the intent, to minimize
the decrease in self-protection associated with increased risk protection. The ACA also explicitly
allows employers to adjust premiums on the basis of self-protection and it will be interesting to see
how that provision is employed and what effect it has on self-protective investments.Chapter 2: Ex Ante Moral Hazard from the Medicaid Medically Needy Program 57
2.A Alternative Deductible Coding
The empirical work in the body of the paper makes two simpliﬁcations which, at ﬁrst glance,
are not obviously correct. First, I code the deductible for individuals living in states without a
Medically Needy program as 0, although in reality their deductible is inﬁnite. Second, my empir-
ical speciﬁcation in (2.4) is interpreted as a difference-in-differences estimator, although it is not
written as such. The essential difﬁculty in writing the speciﬁcation as a standard difference-in-
differences estimator is that the deductible and the Medically Needy dummy are co-linear when I
also include their interaction. To see this, it is useful to ﬁrst recode the deductible so that it is al-
ways ﬁnite. I deﬁne an alternate deductible as AltDeductist =(1 exp( Deductist)), which is 1 in
stateswithouta Medically Needyprogramandis0 forindividualswhohaveno needtospenddown
to enter the Medically Needy program in their state. Now consider the difference-in-differences
model:
yist = b0+b1MNst +b2AltDeductist +b3MNst AltDeductist (2.5)
Where yist is an arbitrary outcome. I claim that (2.5) is not identiﬁed because:
MNst = 1 (AltDeductist  MNst AltDeductist) (2.6)
The ﬁrst term in parentheses in (2.6) is one in states without Medically Needy programs, while the
second term is zero; the second term equals the ﬁrst term in states with Medically Needy programs,
so that the right hand side of the expression is always one in states with a Medically Needy program
and zero otherwise.
In appendix table 2.A I estimate versions of (2.4) using the alternative deductible coding (i.e.
based on the speciﬁcation in (2.5)) excluding the Medically Needy dummy and its interaction with
the introduction of Medicare Part D (odd columns) and excluding the main effect of the alternative
deductible and its interaction with the introduction of Medicare Part D (even columns). None of
the qualitative conclusions are affected by this coding, although it is more difﬁculty to interpret the
coefﬁcients on the alternative deductible.23
23One can differentiate (2.5) with respect to the deductible to get
¶yist
¶Deductist
= (b2+b3MNst)exp( Deductist), which does not have a natural economic interpretation.Chapter 3
Mental Health Beneﬁts and Labor Supply
3.1 Introduction
In the United States, health insurance is a common component of an employee’s compensation.
Most Americans with private health insurance have their coverage from either their own or a family
member’s employer. However, employer-sponsored insurance plans vary widely in terms of the
services covered and the generosity with which those services are covered. Because lower wages
offset the cost of employer-sponsored health insurance (Kolstad and Kowalski, 2012; Summers,
1989), individuals pay for their employer-sponsored policy when they choose to work at ﬁrms that
offer health insurance (Rosen, 1986). Therefore, there should be a positive correlation between
an individual’s valuation of health insurance and the generosity of her coverage,1 which is due
to either employers setting beneﬁts in response to desired employee preferences or employees
considering health insurance coverage when choosing a job.
In this paper, I test if employees consider the fringe beneﬁts offered by an employer when
accepting a job. To do so, I use the enactment of laws mandating that employer-sponsored health
insurance plans must include mental health coverage. These laws should uniformly reduce labor
demand among ﬁrms that offer health insurance by raising the cost of providing health insurance.2
However, the effect on labor supply depends on the mechanism that yields the positive correlation
1This correlation is unlikely to equal one since individuals are not perfectly mobile.
2Firms can avoid these laws by self-insuring their health insurance plans, but become subject to non-discrimination
laws as a result, that also raise the cost of providing health insurance (Carrington et al., 2002).
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between employee preferences and fringe beneﬁts offered by employers. If the correlation is a
result of an employer responding to the preferences of its employees, then there should be no effect
on labor supply since the beneﬁt is either not valued by the employee or the employee has already
internalized the wage offset, in which case individuals who value the beneﬁt will experience a
relative wage increase. On the other hand, if an employer offers a beneﬁts package and employees
choose to accept the job then a beneﬁt mandate should increase the labor supply of an individual
who values the mandate since the beneﬁt substitutes for cash wages, which shifts her labor supply
curve out.
Using data on the design of insurance plans from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey and
the Employee Beneﬁts Survey, I ﬁrst show that industries in which mental health coverage be-
came more likely or more generous between 1996 and 2008 saw an increase in the average mental
distress of employees with employer-sponsored insurance. I measure mental distress using a vali-
dated, self-reported scale that is predictive of mental illness (Kessler et al., 2003).3 I also demon-
strate that industries with a larger increase in the fraction of insured employees in states that enact
these regulations have larger increases in the average mental distress of new employees and also
have larger increases in the likelihood and generosity of coverage for mental illness, indicating that
the regulations affected at least some employers. These results provide some evidence that sorting
occurs and suggest that employees were choosing employers on the basis of mental health beneﬁts.
Using data from the National Health Interview Survey from 1997 to 2001 on individual labor
supply, mental distress, and insurance coverage I directly test for sorting using the beneﬁt mandate.
For less educated individuals, for whom the trade-off between insurance coverage and cash wages
is more stark, I document an increase in hours worked in response to these mental health beneﬁt
mandates for individuals who changed jobs in the prior year and have health insurance from their
employer who value the beneﬁts more highly. But individuals who do not switch jobs or are more
educated do not increase labor supply in response to these mandates. These results are consistent
with employees responding to employer offers of fringe beneﬁts.
3The Kessler scale is not sensitive to coding intensity, but is responsive to treatment, so one would expect lower
distress scores among individuals who receive mental health treatment.Chapter 3: Mental Health Beneﬁts and Labor Supply 60
3.2 Mandating Mental Health Beneﬁts and Heterogeneous Val-
uations
3.2.1 Regulation of Mental Health Beneﬁts
Historically, employers have provided less generous insurance coverage for mental health
needs than for physical health needs. This disparity was motivated by evidence that demand for
mental health care is more price elastic than the demand for physical health care (Newhouse,
1993),4 and because employers feared attracting less healthy employees if they offered generous
mental health beneﬁts (McGuire and Montgomery, 1982).5
Many states responded to the disparity in coverage for mental and physical health care by
regulating the mental health beneﬁts included in employer-sponsored and individually purchased
insurance plans. These regulations vary in the margin that they affect, with some regulations
requiring that ﬁrms offer a minimum level of mental health coverage, while other regulations affect
the generosity of coverage, and some regulations do both. Regulations affecting the generosity of
mental health coverage typically affect the out-of-pocket costs to the consumer and in many cases
only apply to ﬁrms that choose to offer mental health coverage. In addition to state regulations,
there is also a Federal mental health beneﬁt mandate that requires ﬁrms offering mental health
coverage to have equal maximum beneﬁt limits and out-of-pocket cost-sharing, which took effect
in 1998. This Federal mandate interacts with state level mandates that require employers to include
mental health coverage so that those states effectively both require mental health coverage and
regulate the generosity of that coverage.
Despitetherapidexpansionofmentalhealthbeneﬁtregulationsinthe1990s, whichinprinciple
affected nearly half the population, exemptions built into the beneﬁt regulations, typically based on
ﬁrm size or cost growth (Gitterman et al., 2001), and a Federal law exempted many insurance plans
4Recent observational research ﬁnds a much smaller price elasticity for mental health care (Barry et al., 2006;
Meyerhoefer and Zuvekas, 2010), which may be due to an increase in insurers providing incentives for physicians to
provide less care, rather than relying on the consumer’s out-of-pocket price to limit utilization.
5If the cost of the mental health beneﬁt is correlated with a worker’s valuation of the beneﬁt and if workers choose
employers on the basis of beneﬁts, then ﬁrms offering a mental health beneﬁt will spend more for insuring its employ-
ees than for insuring a random sample of potential employees (the ﬁrm will be adversely selected).Chapter 3: Mental Health Beneﬁts and Labor Supply 61
from these regulations.6 As a consequence, less than 20% of the population was actually affected
by the beneﬁt mandates (Buchmueller et al., 2007). However, even if a ﬁrm is exempt from beneﬁt
regulations, in equilibrium the ﬁrm may need to adjust wages or mental health beneﬁts in order
to remain competitive, thus the regulations are likely to affect ﬁrms that are not subject to the
regulations.7
3.2.2 Effects of Mental Health and Other Beneﬁt Mandates
Most empirical research on mental health beneﬁt regulations have focused on the effects of
mental health parity mandates, which should have the largest effects by mandating coverage of
mental health care and lowering the out-of-pocket cost of mental health care.
The largest study of the effect of mandating mental health parity on utilization of mental health
services comes from an experiment in the Federal Employees Health Beneﬁt Program, in which
plans were required to implement mental health parity. Despite the decrease in out-of-pocket
costs associated with the mandate, the change in spending on mental health and substance abuse
treatment was similar for the Federal plans and a matched set of private comparison plans after
the mandate took effect (Goldman et al., 2006). But a number of plans in the FEHBP began to
incentivize providers to limit mental health utilization after the mandate took effect, which tends
to slow the growth in mental health spending (Zuvekas et al., 2002), while the private comparison
plans had already taken these steps to slow the growth in mental health spending. The result is that
the experiment provides a lower bound for the effect of parity on mental health spending.
Other analyses of mental health parity mandates have likewise found no or small effects on
utilization. Early studies using cross-sectional data from the Healthcare for Communities survey
found that parity legislation reduced mental health care utilization, although states that went on
to pass mental health parity mandates had lower mental health utilization prior to passing parity
mandates than states that did not pass such laws (Pacula and Sturm, 2000; Sturm and Pacula,
6ERISA allows ﬁrms to self-insure a health insurance plan and exempts self-insured plans from state regulation (in
a self-insured plan, the insurer writes checks on the employer’s account, rather than it’s own account). Because the
exemption is applied at the plan level, ﬁrms must self-insure all of their health insurance offerings in order to be fully
exempt from state regulations.
7The regulations effectively increase the reservation utility of some employees or makes the labor supply curve to
the ﬁrm more elastic. In either case, the implication is that even if the ﬁrm is not directly subject to the mandate, the
ﬁrm must still respond to beneﬁt mandates by either increasing wages or offering similar beneﬁts.Chapter 3: Mental Health Beneﬁts and Labor Supply 62
1999). Using longitudinal data from the same survey, Bao and Sturm (2004) conclude that “strong”
parity legislation—laws requiring equality in all cost-sharing dimensions and without exemptions
by employer size—increases mental health care utilization for individuals with probable mental
disorders, based on a triple difference approach comparing individuals with greater mental health
need to those with less need for mental health treatment, before and after these regulations took
effect.
Two more recent studies conclude that parity regulations increase the use of mental health
services and reduce out-of-pocket spending for individuals in need of mental health care. Busch
and Barry (2008) use data from the National Survey of America’s Families to estimate the effect of
parity regulations on mental health service utilization. Unlike previous studies, Busch and Barry
distinguish individuals by the size of their employer in order to remove individuals who worked at
employers that were exempt from parity mandates. They ﬁnd an increase in the likelihood of using
anymentalhealthcareamongindividualsworkingatﬁrmswith50to100employees. Theseeffects
were larger for lower income individuals and individuals in worse mental health. In a second study
using privately insured children from the Children with Special Health Care Needs survey, Barry
and Busch (2007) demonstrate that parity laws also reduce the ﬁnancial burden of mental illness
on families.
Cseh (2008) is the only recent paper to consider the effect of mental health beneﬁt regulations
on labor market outcomes. Using data from the March CPS supplement for individuals working at
ﬁrms with fewer than 100 employees he estimates the effects of parity mandates on the probability
of having employer provided health insurance, contributions towards insurance, hours worked,
fulltime work, and earnings. In no case is there a statistically signiﬁcant effect of mental health
parity mandates on these outcomes.
Studies of other mandated beneﬁts have shown effects on labor market outcomes. Gruber
(1994a) studied the introduction of maternity coverage mandates, which married women of child-
bearing age will, on average, value more highly than would unmarried men. Using the introduction
of state mandates in a triple difference model he ﬁnds that mandating maternity coverage reduced
wages for married women of childbearing age, relative to unmarried men, and a subsequent Fed-
eral law had similar effects, but did not study the effect on hours worked. Lahey (2012) uses a
similar empirical approach to show that mandating coverage of infertility treatment reduces the
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to use infertility treatment, indicating that infertility mandates are not valued at cost (Summers,
1989).
However, two other studies of mandated beneﬁts found no effect on employer-sponsored in-
surance or labor market outcomes. Gruber (1994b) studies ﬁve “high-cost” mandates8 that were
enacted in the late 1970 and 1980s. While the point estimates indicate that the mandates reduces
private insurance coverage among employed individuals, none were statistically signiﬁcant. Using
data on existing insurance plans, Gruber concludes that the mandates were not binding since many
ﬁrms, both large and small, were already providing the beneﬁts. Kaestner and Simon (2002),
using a similar approach, ﬁnds little evidence that beneﬁt mandates and other insurance market
regulations affect the labor market, with a modest effect on hours worked at ﬁrms with 25 to 99
employees, and minor effects on hourly wages.
The literature on utilization effects of mental health parity laws provide weak evidence that the
parity mandates were binding on at least some ﬁrms. The lack of any labor supply effects is con-
sistent with studies of other mandates (although those papers also study mental health mandates).
But the two cases in which mandated beneﬁts did have labor supply effects both feature identiﬁable
groups that are statistically more likely to beneﬁt from the mandate.
3.2.3 Beneﬁt Mandates when Valuations Vary
The effect of beneﬁt mandates on the supply and demand for labor is well understood (Gruber,
1992, 1994a; Gruber and Krueger, 1991; Summers, 1989). Summers (1989) provided one early
exposition of the implications of a beneﬁt mandate and distinguished the effects of a beneﬁt man-
date from a tax-ﬁnanced beneﬁt program. Both interventions decrease labor demand, by raising the
cost of hiring an individual, but the beneﬁt mandate also affects labor supply. In particular, if indi-
viduals value the mandate at the cost to the employer of providing the mandate then the increase in
labor supply will restore the original level of employment. Gruber (1992, 1994a) extended the the-
ory to the case in which individuals differ in their valuation of a mandated beneﬁt. In this model,
the wage offered to high valuation individuals falls by the full cost of the mandate if high valuation
individuals value the mandate at cost, or if high and low valuation individuals are perfect substi-
8Minimum beneﬁts for alcoholism treatment, drug abuse treatment, and mental illness, mandated coverage of
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tutes. The ﬁrst condition reﬂects the fact that when employees value the beneﬁt at cost, providing
the beneﬁt and reducing wages by the cost of the beneﬁt leaves the supply curve unchanged and
does not affect demand for low valuation workers. The second condition arises because the ﬁrm
can shift the labor demand curves for high and low valuation workers independently.
These shifts in labor demand and supply can be used to identify sorting and distinguish be-
tween alternative mechanisms for generating sorting. Consider ﬁrst the case when ﬁrms respond to
preferences of their employees (Bundorf, 2002; Goldstein and Pauly, 1976; Scott et al., 1989), in
which case ﬁrms will already be providing the lowest cost compensation package to their employ-
ees, subject to a utility constraint (Scott et al., 1989). In this setting the beneﬁt mandate will have
no effect on labor supply, unless the cost of providing the beneﬁt is lower when it is mandated
than when it is offered on a voluntary basis.9 Alternatively, employees may choose employers
(partially) on the basis of the fringe beneﬁts that employer offers. In this setting, a beneﬁt mandate
that is not valued only increases the cost to the employer of hiring an individual, which shifts labor
demand in. But, for individuals who value the beneﬁt the mandate substitutes for compensation
at ﬁrms that did not previously offer the beneﬁt, resulting in an outward shift in their labor supply
curve.
3.3 Empirical Methods
My empirical approach is to estimate a difference-in-difference-in-difference model10 of the
effect of mandating that mental health beneﬁts be included in health insurance plans. I allow the
estimated effect to vary with mental distress11, which I use as a proxy for an individual’s valuation
of mental health coverage. The resulting model for individual i in MSA c, month m, and year t is:
9For example, the mental health beneﬁts that I study have historically not been provided because employers feared
attracting more expensive individuals, which would raise the cost of providing mental health beneﬁts. The beneﬁt
mandate provides a way to circumvent the adverse selection problem and should increase wages for individuals who
were receiving the beneﬁt on a voluntary basis prior the mandate.
10Comparing before versus after the mandate takes effect, low versus high education, and individuals who stay at
versus switch jobs.
11 The mental distress score is the six-item Kessler scale (Kessler et al., 2003), which is based on an individual’s
self-reported response to six statements, is designed for use in large population based studies, and is predictive of
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Oicmt =b1Benefitsct +b2Distressi+b3NewJobi+b4HighEdi+b511997
+ f (Distressi)+XiG+cc+mm+tt +eicmt
(3.1)
Where Oicmt is an outcome, Benefitsct is an indicator that equals one when employers who
offer health insurance are required to cover mental illness in MSA c in year t, Distressi is a stan-
dardized (to variance 1) Kessler score.12 NewJobi is an indicator that equals one if the individual
has been at her current job for one year or less. HighEdi is an indicator for having any college
education, and the last term, 11997, is a dummy for the year prior to the implementation of the Fed-
eral mental health beneﬁts mandate. I also include all two-, three-, four-, and ﬁve-way interactions
of these variables. Including the interactions with 11997 ensures that the remaining coefﬁcients
reﬂect the effect of the mental health mandates after the Federal law took effect. Xi is a vector
of additional demographic covariates that include gender, age, education, marital status, and race/
ethnicity, and I include MSA, year, and month ﬁxed effects (cc, mm and tt). In the results below,
I report the coefﬁcient on Benefitsct and its interactions with Distressi, NewJobi and HighEdi. In
models in which the dependent variable is either being employed or having switched jobs I omit
NewJobi.
In order to facilitate interpretation, I also compute the average effect of implementing the ben-
eﬁt mandate for individuals deﬁned by NewJobi, HighEdi, and the presence (or absence) of any
distress.13
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Correlations Between Mental Distress, Beneﬁts, and Regulations
If individuals are sorting into different industries on the basis of mental health beneﬁts, then
industries that, on average, have a greater increase in the generosity of mental health beneﬁts
12The mean standardized Kessler score is 0:78, corresponding to a raw score of 2:2.
13In total there are eight groups. When I compute the average effect for distressed individuals, I do so at the average
level of distress for individuals with any distress (1.39 standard deviations or a raw score of 3.9).Chapter 3: Mental Health Beneﬁts and Labor Supply 66
should also have a larger change in mental distress among their new employees. Figure 3.1 uses
Figure 3.1: Sorting Into Industry.
Note: Each circle corresponds to the change in average mental distress of new employees and change in the
probability of inpatient mental coverage (left) or actuarial value of the mental health beneﬁt (right) for a given
industry. Change in the actuarial value is the change in the average actuarial value based on data on insurance plans
from the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey and the availability of certain types of mental health beneﬁts from
the 2008 Employee Beneﬁts Survey, weighted by the average actuarial values from the 1996 data (see Data Appendix
for details). Change in inpatient coverage is the change in the fraction of ﬁrms with health insurance in a given
industry offering inpatient mental health coverage. Change in distress is the change in average mental distress among
newly employed individuals with insurance from their employer in a given industry. Circles are proportional to
weighted number of new hires with insurance in that industry in 2009. Fitted line from OLS regression weighted by
the inverse of the sum of the variance in mental distress for 1997 and 2009 (this is the variance of the change,
assuming that mental distress is uncorrelated over time).
data on insurance beneﬁts from the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey Health Insurance
Plan Abstract ﬁle, which combines data on individuals with descriptions of their health insurance
plans, and the 2008 Employee Beneﬁts Survey14 and mental distress from the 1997 and 2009
National Health Interview Surveys to document sorting by new employees into more generous
industries (these data are described in detail in the Data Appendix; the industries are listed in
14This is the ﬁrst year after 1996 for which data on mental health beneﬁts are available that provides a breakdown
by industry. Previous years of both the Employer Beneﬁts Survey and the National Compensation Survey provide data
on mental health beneﬁts by type of plan, but those data are insufﬁcient to test for sorting.Chapter 3: Mental Health Beneﬁts and Labor Supply 67
appendix table 3.A along with the average Kessler score, coverage of inpatient and outpatient
mental health care, and actuarial value for 1996 and 2008; I exclude Utilities and Other Services
from the analysis). Each panel plots the change in generosity against the change in distress, with
the circles corresponding to the number of insured new employees in each industry group in 2009.
The left panel plots changes in the extensive margin of inpatient mental health coverage against
the change in average mental distress. Industries that increased coverage of mental health also
had an increase in mental distress among new employees. The ﬁtted regression line, which is
weighted by the inverse of the variance of the change in mental distress,15 indicates that a one
percent increase in the probability of offering mental health coverage increased average mental
distress by .007 standard deviations. The right panel plots the intensive margin of inpatient mental
health coverage and demonstrates that mental distress is lower in industries that reduced the share
of inpatient mental health spending covered by insurance, with a one percentage point increase in
the generosity of mental health coverage increasing mental distress by 0.001 standard deviations.
These results provide some indication that individuals are sorting on the basis of beneﬁts, but
must be interpreted with caution. First, the NHIS only provides insurance information for one adult
in the household, but individuals may be seeking family coverage due to another family member’s
mental distress, rather than their own. Second, I am observing a measure of current mental dis-
tress, rather than distress at the time the individual chose her employer. Third, I do not observe
the beneﬁts at the individual’s own employer, but rather I observe the average for the industry of
her employer. However, table 3.1 shows that the positive correlation between beneﬁts and mental
distress (top panel) is due to new employees and that there is generally only a weak relationship
between the generosity of mental health coverage and mental distress for existing employees. But
this is not surprising—if mental health care reduces an individual’s mental distress, then the rela-
tionship between the generosity of mental health beneﬁts and mental distress is ambiguous because
more individuals will be treated when beneﬁts are more generous leading to lower mental distress
scores and attenuating the relationship between the generosity of mental health coverage and men-
tal distress for existing employees.
These results, however, only provide evidence on sorting into industries. Figure 3.2 shows
15 Denoting the standard error of the mean before the policy by SE0 and after by SE1 the variance of the difference
is assumed to be SE2
0 +SE2
1 (so I am assuming that mental distress in an industry is not autocorrelated).Chapter 3: Mental Health Beneﬁts and Labor Supply 68
Figure 3.2: Beneﬁt Regulations and Generosity of Mental Health Coverage.
Note: Each circle corresponds to the change in the probability of inpatient mental coverage (left) or actuarial value of
the mental health beneﬁt (right) and the change in the share of insured individuals in a given industry living in a state
with a mental health beneﬁts mandate. See Note to Figure 3.1 for description of change in actuarial value. Change in
the percent subject to beneﬁt mandates is the change from 1996 to 2008 in the fraction of employed individuals with
insurance from their employer in that industry who live in a state with a beneﬁt mandate (using the 1997 and 2009
March CPS supplements). Circles are proportional to weighted number of people in that industry in the 2009 March
CPS. Fitted line from OLS regression weighted by the inverse of the sum of the variance of generosity for 1996 and
2008.
that industries with a greater increase in (all) insured employees in states that mandate coverage
of mental health beneﬁts are more likely to provide inpatient mental health coverage (left panel)
and provide more generous coverage (right), than industries that experienced less growth in those
states.16 The implication is that the beneﬁt mandates were binding on some ﬁrms and may be
used as a proxy for the generosity of beneﬁts at an individual ﬁrm. The bottom panel of table 3.1
indicates that an increase in the share of insured employees exposed to a beneﬁt mandate increases
the generosity of inpatient mental health beneﬁts, but reduces outpatient mental health beneﬁts.
16Using all, rather than just new, employees with employer-sponsored insurance is the appropriate approach because
the beneﬁt mandate applies to all employees, not merely newly hired employees.Chapter 3: Mental Health Beneﬁts and Labor Supply 69
Table 3.1: Association Between Mental Distress and Generosity of Mental Health Beneﬁts
Total Inpatient Outpatient









D Beneﬁt Generosity -0.05 -0.61 -0.05 -0.01 -0.02
(0.05) (0.48) (0.08) (0.15) (0.03)
New Employee 0.82 1.34 0.13 -0.98 0.34
(0.20) (4.79) (0.36) (0.58) (0.14)
D % Mandated Beneﬁts 0.08
(0.86)
 New Employees 0.67
(3.18)
R-squared 0.30 0.02 0.02 0.12 0.22 0.01
N 22 22 22 22 22 22
D distress 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
D Beneﬁt Generosity
D % Mandated Beneﬁts -4.25 0.12 2.19 -1.33 -6.64
(2.94) (0.25) (2.66) (1.15) (4.37)
R-squared 0.18 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.19
N 11 11 11 11 11
Mean change in generosity -0.00 -0.00 -0.07 -0.13 -0.07
Note: The dependent variable in top panel is the change in average mental distress of employees with insurance from
1997 to 2009. D Beneﬁt Generosity is the change in the indicated measure of mental health coverage from 1996 to
2008. D% Mandated Beneﬁts is the change in the percent of employed individuals with insurance from their
employer in an industry who live in a state with a beneﬁt mandate using the 1997 and 2009 March CPS supplements.
The dependent variable in the bottom panel is D Beneﬁt Generosity. All regressions are weighted by the inverse of
the variance of the change in the dependent variable. Data on plan beneﬁts from the 1996 MEPS Health Insurance
Plan Abstract ﬁle and the 2008 Employer Beneﬁts Survey, data on mental distress in the top panel from the 1997 and
2009 NHIS, data on change in the percent subject to mandated beneﬁts from the 1997 and 2009 March CPS
supplements; see Data Appendix for details.
3.4.2 Effects of Mandated Fringe Beneﬁts on Labor Supply
The previous results provide some evidence of sorting into different industries on the basis
of mental health beneﬁts. I now turn to microdata from the NHIS, which are described in more
detail in the Data Appendix. The NHIS, while the best survey data generally available for my
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employment and mental distress on one adult and one child, if any, in each household. I restrict
my sample to adults who are living alone in order to eliminate potential sources of bias due to
unmeasured spousal mental distress and labor supply and because demand for insurance for one’s
child may differ from demand for insurance for oneself. A second difﬁculty arises because the
reference period for questions on earned income, months worked, and hours worked differ—the
prior calendar year for earned income and months worked, but the previous week or “usually”
for hours worked.17 In order to avoid misattributing any effects of the beneﬁt mandates, I further
restrict my sample by excluding 1998, when the Federal mandate took effect, and the ﬁrst year
in which a mandate is in effect in a given state, so that identical regulations are in effect for the
reference periods for all three questions—earned income, months worked, and hours worked.
Table 3.2 presents summary statistics from the NHIS sample for individuals in states with and
without requirements that health insurance include mental health beneﬁts. In general, individuals
in states that require mental health beneﬁts have higher labor market earnings and wages, but there
are no differences on most of the other covariates, except that individuals in states with mandated
mental health coverage are more likely to have at least some college education.
I begin by documenting the effect of requiring mental health beneﬁts on employment, job
switching, part time employment, and insurance coverage (both employer-sponsored and indi-
vidually purchased). Table 3.3 presents results from estimating the regression in (3.1) for these
outcomes. All models include MSA and year ﬁxed effects, control for education, gender, age,
race, marital status, and mental distress. Standard errors are clustered on state and all regressions
are weighted to be representative of the U.S. urban population. The ﬁrst four rows provide the
parameter estimates for individuals who never went to college, while the remaining four rows of
results indicate how individuals with any college experience differ from individuals without any
college.18 Columns (1)-(3) indicate that there is no change in employment in response to a mental
17These questions are similar to the questions on earnings, weeks worked, and hours worked in the March CPS
supplement.
18I include the interaction with any college for two reasons. First, education was the only meaningful difference
among the covariates between states with and without a beneﬁt mandate. Second, more highly educated individuals are
more likely to have employer-sponsored health insurance, meaning that there is little room for individuals to increase
labor supply in order to get health insurance, so the effect of the beneﬁt regulation on the high education group should
come from shifts in labor demand, rather than supply (80:2% of individuals with at least some college have employer-
sponsored health insurance, while only 65:7% of individuals with a high school degree or less have health insurance
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
No Mandate Mandate
Mean S. D. Mean S. D.
Earnings, last year ($) 46551 26312 50813 28209
Months worked, last year 11.4 1.8 11.4 1.9
Hours worked 43.4 11.9 42.9 12.1
Hourly Wage ($) 25.30 24.69 28.05 24.06
Employer-Sponsored HI 0.77 0.42 0.76 0.43
New Job 0.34 0.47 0.33 0.47
Part Time 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27
Employed 0.86 0.35 0.85 0.35
Female 0.43 0.49 0.43 0.50
Age 38.7 12.4 38.9 12.5
Education
No Schooling 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.04
Elementary School 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.15
Some High School 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.19
High School 0.23 0.42 0.19 0.39
Some College 0.44 0.50 0.47 0.50
College 0.26 0.44 0.28 0.45
Race
White 0.70 0.46 0.70 0.46
Black 0.19 0.39 0.14 0.34
Hispanic 0.08 0.27 0.11 0.32
Other 0.03 0.16 0.05 0.22
Marital status
Married 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Divorced 0.27 0.44 0.26 0.44
Widowed 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.20
Separated 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.22
Unmarried 0.63 0.48 0.64 0.48
Mental Distress 0.77 1.03 0.80 1.04
Mental Distress, raw 2.16 2.89 2.24 2.92
N 6415 4401
Note: All ﬁgures weighted to be representative of the U.S. urban population. Variables relating to work (earnings
through part time) are for the employed population; unemployed individuals are coded as missing.
health mandate and that individuals who would be expected to beneﬁt from the mandate—those
at higher distress—are less likely to switch jobs after the mandate takes effect than before. The
remaining two columns indicate that there is a signiﬁcant change in employer-sponsored insuranceChapter 3: Mental Health Beneﬁts and Labor Supply 72
Table 3.3: Employment and Insurance Effects of Beneﬁt Mandates
Employment Insurance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Employed New Job Part time Employer Individual
Beneﬁt Required 0.008 -0.031 0.032 -0.119** 0.011
(0.029) (0.040) (0.023) (0.035) (0.018)
 Distress -0.010 -0.033+ -0.024 0.080** 0.002
(0.015) (0.019) (0.017) (0.025) (0.008)
 New job -0.010 0.274** 0.012
(0.039) (0.072) (0.024)
 Distress -0.011 -0.229** -0.005
(0.031) (0.053) (0.012)
 Any College 0.007 0.039 -0.010 0.108** -0.025
(0.023) (0.035) (0.017) (0.029) (0.018)
 Distress 0.003 0.005 0.030 -0.091* 0.019
(0.018) (0.027) (0.020) (0.035) (0.016)
 New job -0.009 -0.342** -0.011
(0.043) (0.073) (0.032)
 Distress 0.019 0.287** -0.002
(0.036) (0.059) (0.017)
R-squared 0.13 0.16 0.10 0.12 0.03
N 10812 7032 7029 7032 7032
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Notes: Dependent variables are indicators for being employed, working in a job for one year or less, working in a
part-time job, having health insurance from one’s employer, and purchasing health insurance on the individual
market, respectively. Beneﬁt Required is an indicator if the state during that year requires ﬁrms that offer health
insurance to also provide coverage for mental illness. Distress is the Kessler mental distress score, normalized to have
a variance of 1. Any College is a dummy for heaving at least some college education. Standard errors clustered on
state in parentheses. All models include MSA and year ﬁxed effects, a cubic polynomial in mental distress and a
dummy for no distress, education, gender, a quintic polynomial in age, race, and marital status.
coverage, but that there is no effect on individually purchased health insurance. The decrease in
switching for more distressed individuals after the mandate takes effect is consistent with sorting
on beneﬁts because after the mandate takes effect all ﬁrms19 that provide health insurance must
include mental health beneﬁts, so there is less of a need to switch between jobs to ﬁnd jobs offering
mental health coverage. The pattern of results for employer-sponsored health insurance is consis-
19Technically, only ﬁrms that are explicitly subject to the mandate, but it is likely that competition in the labor
market will result in the mandate binding on other ﬁrms as well.Chapter 3: Mental Health Beneﬁts and Labor Supply 73
tent with this argument since after the mandate takes effect distressed individuals who switch jobs
are less likely to take a job offering health insurance than before the mandate.
In general, the mandate appears to increase the cost of insurance for less educated individuals,
resulting in less insurance coverage. But (moderately) distressed individuals20 and individuals
who switch jobs are both more likely to have employer-sponsored insurance after the mandate
takes effect. These results are consistent with distressed individuals sorting into jobs that provide
health insurance after the mandate takes effect. For individuals who have been to college the effect
of the mandate is essentially zero, although individuals who switch jobs are more likely to ﬁnd a
job that does not provide health insurance after the mandate.
Table 3.4 presents coefﬁcient estimates from estimating (3.1) for earnings, hours worked, and
wagesforallemployedindividuals(columns1-4)andjustforindividualswithemployer-sponsored
health insurance (columns 5-8), while table 3.5 presents the average effect of the beneﬁt mandate
for eight types of individuals. The ﬁrst row presents the main effect of mandating mental health
beneﬁts, which indicates that the mandate leads to a substantial decline in income, reﬂecting a
decrease in hours worked each week and a decrease in the wage, but there is no effect on months
worked. There is a smaller effect on individuals who have any college education (the difference
between no college and any college is not statistically signiﬁcant, but the total effect for any college
is signiﬁcantly different from zero), primarily because of smaller decreases in hours worked.21
These effects imply that there is a broad decrease in the demand for labor affecting individuals
with and without insurance from their employer.22 Mental distress reduces the negative impact of
the beneﬁt mandate on earnings, primarily by reducing the effect of the mandate on hours worked
and wages. This effect may arise from a number of sources. First, if distressed individuals have
(partially) sorted into ﬁrms that provide mental health beneﬁts prior to the mandate then the effect
of the mandate will be smaller for distressed individual because fewer individuals are affected by
20The effect of the beneﬁt mandate on distressed switchers is positive as long as their mental distress scores are less
than 1.04 standard deviations, which is approximately 40% of individuals who report any distress.
21These results differ from the results in Cutler and Madrian (1998), who conclude that rising health insurance costs,
which are a ﬁxed cost per employee, increase hours worked. But a beneﬁt mandate affects the beneﬁts individuals
purchase, not prices, so their theoretical result that an increase in the price of health insurance should increase hours
worked does not apply.
22The results indicate a decrease in labor demand because the decrease in both wages and hours worked corresponds
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the mandate. A second reason for the smaller effect of mental distress is if the mandate makes
distressed individuals more productive, which should affect insured individuals, but not uninsured
individuals, and would manifest as larger effects of the mandate for individuals with insurance
than for individuals without insurance. Table 3.5 provides little evidence that this is true, at least
in logs, with the mandate reducing wages by .035 log points for distressed individuals who stay at
their job and by .026 log points for individuals with insurance from their employer.
Lastly,the effect of the mandate should be most pronounced for individuals who switch jobs,
rather than individuals who remain in existing jobs, if individuals are sorting on the basis of bene-
ﬁts. There are no statistically signiﬁcant effects of switching jobs among all individuals, but there
are differential effects of the beneﬁt mandate for individuals with employer-sponsored insurance—
these individuals earn higher wages and work longer hours than their peers who do not switch jobs,
although the wage increase is smaller for distressed individuals. The decrease in wages for dis-
tressed individuals may simply reﬂect a decision to take some of their compensation in the form of
more generous insurance coverage, but my data do not permit me to compare the beneﬁts offered
to distressed and non-distressed individuals.
These results can, as in the case for individuals who remain at their jobs, be interpreted in
terms of changes in labor demand and labor supply. With the exception of less educated, distressed
individuals who change jobs after the mandate takes effect, the pattern of changes in hours worked
and wages indicate shifts in labor demand. With one exception these changes indicate a decrease
in labor demand, which is consistent with a costly mandate, while the exceptional case—non-
distressed, insured, less-educated individuals who switch jobs—experiences an increase in labor
demand and may indicate that ﬁrms are substituting towards less educated employees and away
from more highly educated employees. Among less educated, but distressed individuals, there is a
marked increase in labor supply, with a large decrease in wages among all employees and a modest
decrease once I restrict to individuals who have insurance from their employer.
3.5 Conclusions
In this paper I have demonstrated that individuals take the beneﬁts offered by an employer, in
this case coverage for mental illness, into account when choosing a new employer. I ﬁrst demon-Chapter 3: Mental Health Beneﬁts and Labor Supply 77
strated that there was a larger increase in the average mental distress of new hires with health
insurance for industries in which mental health coverage became more generous between 1996
and 2008. This relationship is consistent with either individuals choosing to work in industries
on the basis of fringe beneﬁts, or ﬁrms offering fringe beneﬁts on the basis of employee prefer-
ences. I also demonstrated that as the share of insured employees living in states that mandate
mental health coverage increases the average mental distress of new hires also increases and the
same mechanism was also associated with an increase in the generosity of inpatient mental health
insurance coverage, suggesting that mental health beneﬁt mandates were binding on some ﬁrms.
Next, using data from the National Health Interview Survey, which provides data on mental
distress, labor supply, and insurance coverage, I show that mandating mental health beneﬁts re-
duces the demand for labor for most individuals. However, there is an increase in labor supply for
distressed, less-educated individual who choose to switch jobs and an increase in labor demand for
non-distressed, but otherwise comparable individuals. The increase in labor supply is consistent
with employees choosing ﬁrms on the basis of the beneﬁts that are available, but does not rule out
the possibility that ﬁrms are also responding to employee preferences when setting fringe beneﬁts.
As states consider new health insurance beneﬁt mandates, which is a requirement in the Afford-
able Care Act,23 it is important to keep in mind how these mandates will affect the labor market.
While mandating mental health coverage increased labor supply for individuals who valued the
beneﬁt, there were also adverse consequences on more educated individuals and individuals in
better mental health. Hence, mandating beneﬁts that are valued by a large number of people may
cause fewer labor market distortions than mandates that affect a smaller number of individuals,
particularly if these individuals are particularly costly to insure.
23Technically states are deﬁning a minimum beneﬁts package but this semantic distinction has no economic signif-
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3.A Data Appendix
Data for this paper come from a variety of sources. Employee beneﬁts data come from the 1996
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey Health Insurance Plan Abstract ﬁle and the 2008 Employer
Beneﬁts Survey from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The main empirical work uses the NHIS
Sample, which is derived from the National Health Interview Survey from 1997 through 2001.
3.A.1 Employee Beneﬁts and Mental Health Coverage
Data on mental health coverage in employee beneﬁt plans come from two sources: the 1996
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey Health Insurance Plan Abstract ﬁle and the 2008 Employer
Beneﬁts Survey from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The 1996 Plan Abstract ﬁle provides de-
tailed data on more than 5,000 plan-policyholder pairs including indicators for coverage of mental
healthbeneﬁts, mentalhealth-speciﬁcandoveralldeductibles, coinsuranceandcopaymentrequire-
ments, and beneﬁt limits. I use data from the 1996 MEPS on individual utilization of inpatient and
outpatient services for mental health reasons24 to construct estimates of total spending and plan
payments.
I calculate plan spending for inpatient mental health care for each conﬁnement, or hospital-
ization, based on the per conﬁnement plan payment parameters—deductibles, beneﬁt limits, and
coinsurance rates. For each conﬁnement from the MEPS data, I ﬁrst calculate the deductible
amount by applying per conﬁnement, per day, and a number of days deductible, converting the
latter into dollars using the average per diem cost from that conﬁnement. I then compute the cost
sharing requirement above the deductible, yielding trial out of pocket and plan payments. The ﬁnal
out of pocket payment is the trial plan payment plus the amount by which the trial plan payment
exceeds the maximum plan beneﬁt. Outpatient spending is calculated in a similar manner, but
rather than specifying payment parameters in terms of conﬁnements, the parameters are deﬁned by
annual limits and per visit costs.
In order to compute the actuarial value of a plan, I calculate average inpatient, outpatient, and
total spending by the individual, the plan, and combined, for each plan. I deﬁne the actuarial
24 I deﬁned a claim as being for a mental health reason if it was associated with any of the following three digit
ICD-9 diagnosis codes: 290, 294-298, 300-302, 306-315, 317, and 319.Chapter 3: Mental Health Beneﬁts and Labor Supply 79
value as the share of total inpatient and outpatient spending paid by the insurance plan and deﬁne
inpatient and outpatient actuarial value in an analogous manner using service speciﬁc spending.
For each plan I also construct indicators for providing any or limited inpatient or outpatient men-
tal health coverage, where I deﬁne limited as more restrictive than other inpatient or outpatient
coverage.
To calculate industry speciﬁc measures of generosity I assign an industry to each plan based
upon the policyholder’s report of the industry of the employer providing the plan. The industry
speciﬁc average value is just the weighted average of the actuarial values.
These data are linked with two different cross-sections. The 1997 NHIS cross-section consists
of all individuals between 18 and 64 reporting insurance from an employer. I assign to each
individual the characteristics of the average plan in her industry, compute her mental distress, and
then compute the industry-speciﬁc average distress. The 1997 March CPS cross-section is deﬁned
in a comparable manner, but I also assign to each individual the mental health beneﬁt regulations
that are in effect in 1996, which permits me to compute the share of insured employees in each
industry that are subject to a beneﬁts mandate.
The 2008 Employer Beneﬁts Survey (EBS) provides far less detailed information on plan ben-
eﬁts. These data identify the fraction of employees in each industry with inpatient and outpatient
mental health coverage and distinguish between those plans providing full or limited coverage. I
use the 1996 plan data to construct average within industry actuarial values for the different levels
of coverage and combine the inpatient and outpatient actuarial values based on the average share
of spending in each category in 1996. I then link these data with the 2009 NHIS cross-section and
the 2009 March CPS cross section, as I did with the 1996 MEPS data.
3.A.2 NHIS Sample
I use data from the 1997 through 2001 National Health Interview Surveys, a nationally repre-
sentative cross-sectional survey of non-institutionalized adults conducted by the Centers for Dis-
ease Control. These time restrictions are necessary because the NHIS did not include a measure of
mental distress until 1997; beginning in 2002, the NHIS no longer provided geographic identiﬁers
below the census region. Prior to 2002 the NHIS identiﬁed the MSA of residents of the largest
MSAs in the country which, along with an indicator for the size of the MSA, can be used to assignChapter 3: Mental Health Beneﬁts and Labor Supply 80
almost every individual living in one of the identiﬁed MSAs to a state (individuals in the Wash-
ington, D.C. and 7 other MSAs could not be uniquely assigned to a state and are dropped from the
analysis25).
I measure mental distress using the six item scale developed by Kessler et al. (2003) for use in
population-based surveys. The scale consists of six sentiments and for each sentiment an individ-
ual chooses one of ﬁve answers ranging from not endorsing the sentiment at all to fully endorsing
a given sentiment. I convert these ﬁve levels into scores from zero to four and deﬁne the mental
distress scale as the sum of the scores. I exclude individuals with a Kessler score greater than 12,
because these individuals are likely to have severe mental disorders that may also affect productiv-
ity (Kessler et al., 2003). In the empirical work, I use a normalized distress score with variance 1,
but I keep the minimum distress score at 0 so that the main effects of the beneﬁt regulation can be
interpreted as the effect for non-distressed individuals.
In a tabulation of data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, I ﬁnd that a one standard
deviation increase in mental distress results is correlated with an $860 increase in total spending for
individuals with employer sponsored insurance, of which the individual is responsible for $125, so
plan premiums should increase by approximately $60 per month per standard deviation of distress
whengoingfromnocoveragetotheaveragelevelofmentalhealthbeneﬁts. Forindividualswithout
employer provided insurance, the comparable spending ﬁgure is $410 per standard deviation of
mental distress all of which is paid by the individual. These differences in spending are not only
due to increased spending on mental health care, but also spending on other medical services that
are correlated with mental health care (Ellis and McGuire, 2007). In essence, individuals who
have higher mental distress scores may be in worse physical health, in addition to being in greater
mental distress.
In addition, the NHIS provides data on insurance coverage, employment, earnings and income,
and hours worked. I deﬁne individual insurance using descriptions of up to four insurance plans
and apply the hierarchy Medicare, Medicaid, other government, employer-sponsored, and self-
25 The excluded MSAs are parts of the Boston-Worcester-Lawrence CMSA, Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill MSA,
parts of the Cincinnati-Hamilton CMSA, Kansas City MSA, Louisville MSA, Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City
CMSA, Portland-Salem CMSA, Providence-Fall River MSA, and St. Louis MSA. The remaining MSAs are in Ari-
zona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.Chapter 3: Mental Health Beneﬁts and Labor Supply 81
purchased insurance to assign a single type of insurance to each individual. In order to develop
a sample that has the most consistent set of incentives, I drop anyone with Medicare coverage,
either due to age or disability, and individuals with other government (non-Medicaid) insurance,
typically from the Indian Health Service or the Department of Veteran’s Affairs.
Data on employment, labor supply, and earnings are, unfortunately, not coded in a manner that
is optimal for economists. In particular, the survey does not ask about weeks worked during the
year, nor about wages, and what data are available have different reference periods. Therefore,
I construct wages using data on wage earnings from the previous calendar year, the number of
months worked in the previous calendar year at any job, and hours worked either last week or
usually. The resulting wage measure is imperfect due to both timing differences between the
components that are used in constructing the wage and the fact that I can not separately identify
the wage of an individual’s current main job.
DataonstatementalhealthregulationsarederivedfromLang(2011), butwithsomedifferences
affecting states with minimum mandated beneﬁt laws. I code a state as mandating a beneﬁt if
Lang indicates that the state had a mental health parity mandate, which requires ﬁrm to provide
mental health beneﬁts if they provide other health insurance, or if Lang indicates that the state
has a minimum beneﬁt and the state law requires ﬁrms to provide, not just to offer, that minimum
beneﬁt.26
26 The states that require mental health beneﬁts (year of implementation in parentheses) are California (1974),
Colorado (1992), Connecticut (2000), Illinois (1991), Louisiana (2001), Massachusetts (1996), Maryland (1995),
Michigan (2000), Minnesota (1995), North Carolina (2008), New Jersey (2000), Oklahoma (2000), Pennsylvania
(1999), Tennessee (1999), Texas (1998), Virginia (2000), Washington (2006), and Wisconsin (1998); states passing
other regulations are Arizona (1998), Florida (1992), Georgia (1998), Indiana (2000), New York (1999), Ohio (1985),
and Utah (2001). North Carolina and Washington, do not have any regulations governing mental health beneﬁts during
the study period.Chapter 4
Supporting Material
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Supporting Table 1.A: HCC Conditions and HRS Mappings
Survey response HCC Description Weight
Diabetes with kidney trouble 15 Diabetes with Renal or Peripheral Circu-
latory Manifestation
0.764
Diabetes without kidney trouble 19 Diabetes without Complication 0.200
Arthritis or rheumatism 38 Rheumatoid Arthritis and Inﬂammatory
Connective Disease Tissue
0.322
Emotional, nervous, or psychiatric prob-
lem
55 Major Depressive, Bipolar, and Paranoid
Disorders
0.431
Congestive Heart Failure 80 Congestive Heart Failure 0.417
Heart attack since last interview 81 Acute Myocardial Infarction 0.348
Angina or chest pains 83 Angina Pectoris/Old Myocardial Infarc-
tion
0.235
Stroke 95 Cerebral Hemorrhage 0.392
Chronic bronchitis or emphysema 108 Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease 0.376
Fractured hip since last wave 158 Hip Fracture/Dislocation 0.392Chapter 4: Supporting Material 84
Supporting Table 1.B: First stage regressions
Without Health Risk With Health Risk





Simulated Deductible 1.001** -0.016 0.990** -0.014
(0.066) (0.020) (0.067) (0.020)
 Part D -0.023 0.980** -0.019 0.970**
(0.043) (0.058) (0.041) (0.059)
MN  Risk -0.439** -0.009
(0.112) (0.024)
MN  Part D  Risk 0.097 -0.305*
(0.145) (0.129)
R-squared 0.06 0.30 0.07 0.30
N 7238 7238 7238 7238
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Notes: Dependent variable is indicated in the column header. Part D is an indicator for 2006 and 2008, Risk is the
standardized health risk score, Simulated Deductible is the average amount an individual within a demographic group
and drawn from a nationwide sample would need to spend to be eligible for coverage under the Medically Needy
program. All models include year, state, and demographic group ﬁxed effects, marital status, a cubic polynomial in
age, and an indicator for smoking. Standard errors clustered on state in parentheses.Chapter 4: Supporting Material 85
Supporting Table 1.C: Alternative Deductible Coding
Health risk Any Private Future Medicaid
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Medically Needy 0.010 -0.023 0.039
(0.094) (0.058) (0.030)
MN  Part D -0.035 0.028 0.044
(0.082) (0.041) (0.029)
Alt Deductible -0.010 0.023 -0.039
(0.094) (0.058) (0.030)
Alt Deductible  Part D 0.035 -0.028 -0.044
(0.082) (0.041) (0.029)
Alt Deductible  MN -0.121 -0.131 0.138 0.161 -0.018 -0.057
(0.191) (0.227) (0.115) (0.159) (0.063) (0.086)
Alt Deductible  Part D  MN -0.124 -0.088 -0.236* -0.264* -0.055 -0.099
(0.195) (0.196) (0.096) (0.123) (0.072) (0.097)
MN  Risk -0.042* -0.042* 0.022* 0.022*
(0.017) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011)
MN  Part D  Risk 0.050* 0.050* -0.057** -0.057**
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Insured 0.013 0.013
(0.050) (0.050)
Part D  Insured -0.139 -0.139
(0.086) (0.086)
MN  Insured -0.098 -0.098
(0.061) (0.061)
MN  Part D  Insured 0.189+ 0.189+
(0.104) (0.104)
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Notes: Dependent variable is indicated in the column header. Part D is an indicator for 2006 and 2008, Risk is the
standardized health risk score, Alt Deductible is the alternative coding for the deductible described in Appendix 1.B.
Insured is an indicator for having any private insurance coverage. All models include year, state, and demographic
group ﬁxed effects, marital status, a cubic polynomial in age, and an indicator for smoking. Standard errors clustered
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